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GLOBAL AND GOING NOWHERE:
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
BY JAMES C. KRASKA*

"How we decide and who gets to decide often determines what we decide."'
ORTHODOXY
I. THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

2

Nearly one hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound discerned between "law in the
3
books" and "law in action." Roscoe Pound was a Dean and Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School. Prophesying the emergence of legal realism, Dean Pound
was a pragmatist who was concerned that lawyers were hiding behind deductive
models disconnected from reality. Pound also was a botanist. He understood that
the sciences had long since abandoned such deductive modes of thinking in search
was too
of inductive reasoning and empirical verification. The "law in the books"
4
often at variance with how the law actually unfolds in the real world. Lawyers
were admonished by Pound not to behave as "legal monks," disconnected from the
real world.5 Dean Pound worried about the application of unrealistic models of law
and how they confounded the attainment of social justice in the United States, but
his wisdom carries valuable lessons for today's international lawyers and
policymakers who are busily constructing the global legal architecture of
. An earlier version of this article was prepared for the capstone Seminar in Contemporary Legal
Thought, The Rule of Law: Controlling Government, at the University of Virginia Law School, while

the author was assigned there on active duty to earn the Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree. The seminar

was led by Professor John Norton Moore, and the author is deeply indebted to him for his invaluable

review and comments, and especially for his generous mentoring on the rule of law. The views
expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The author may be reached at
james.kraska@gmail.com.
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20022004
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at
available
(2004),
POWER
AND
BALANCE, VOICE

pub-3764.html.
2. Inspiration for this article began during the author's participation with the Academic Council
on the United Nations System & American Society of International Law (ACUNS/ASIL) Workshop on
International Organization Studies at the University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia and the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, Aug.-Sep., 2002.
3. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 12-15 (1910).
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id. at 36.
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sustainable development.
There is no doubt that Dean Pound, who dedicated a career to realizing social
justice in action, would today be disappointed to cast his gaze at the widening gulf
between carefully designed international economic, environmental and human
rights regimes on the one hand, and the appalling human condition and
environmental degradation that pervades much of the globe, on the other. This
article is devoted to better understanding the variance between international policy
and law "in the books" and how those international rules are developed and
applied "in action" within the sphere of global sustainable development.
Understanding the nature of this disconnection produces important insights and has
critical implications for global governance.
This article rejects the widely accepted international development orthodoxy
and supports a new discourse emerging in development thought that argues that
democracy promotion is the best way to achieve sustainable development. Part I
reviews the origins of the prevailing orthodoxy of sustainable development. Part II
critiques the application of the orthodoxy and introduces fresh narratives and
empirical perspectives on sustainable development grounded in human freedom
and democracy. Part III concludes with a call to embrace the emerging democratic
development norm.
Since World War II, world development has been captive to an orthodox
approach emanating from two levels of analysis-at the international level, a
Marxist-derived world systems model, and at the state level, an authoritarian
regime model. World systems analysis contributes to the orthodoxy by suggesting
under-development is a function of world systemic or structural defects that
"cause" under-development. It originated in Marxist theory and goes
by the names
dependency theory, neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. At the state level of
analysis, modernization theory has celebrated the development virtues of
authoritarian regimes.
Global environmentalism, which harbors a deep skepticism, and even
hostility, toward economic growth and international trade, has reinforced the
dependency theorists' attack on the world system. The result is a powerful
international front that has sabotaged the development prospects of many underdeveloped states. The state level of analysis has contributed to the orthodoxy by
positing that authoritarian regimes are better at producing development, when in
fact, they are not. The conventional state-level analysis holds that development is a
chaotic and unsettling affair; dictatorships are better at managing the period of
unstable transition. Democracy, which is also disruptive, can only come later, if at
all. This article suggests that the impact of these two approaches-one focusing on
the world system and the other on the state-has been counter-productive, actually
serving to defeat the goals of sustainable development for many of the poorest
nations. A far better approach-centered on democracy-has begun to emerge.
This alternative, challenging the conventional paradigm, should be nurtured and
promoted.
The orthodoxy has a controlling influence on national and international
approaches to sustainable development. Despite the avalanche of empirical
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research supporting the connection between democracy and development,
changing the consensus is not easy. The international law, global rules and
international programs that have sprung from the orthodoxy-the "law in the
books"-have failed Dean Pound's real world test of "law in action."
An alternative model of development focusing on democracy requires a
radical reassessment at the state level of analysis. Liberal democratic regimes
better promote vertical and horizontal economic development, and do so while
better managing and preserving the natural environment. Moreover, these systems
generate prosperity and stability that create the foundation for sustainable
development. The emergence of democracy in one country tends to facilitate trade
and economic growth regionally. A political system that promotes freedom spins
off positive externalities of peace and stability that have a positive impact on
neighboring states. Perhaps most importantly, democracy as a modality for
development departs from the prevailing approach by promoting a genuinely
liberal agenda that celebrates the centrality of individual human freedom, dignity
and self-actualization as the central goal of development.
Today we are in the midst of a new normative campaign on sustainable
development within the United Nations and around the world, comparable 6to the
campaign for decolonization in the 1960s and anti-apartheid in the 1980s It is
particularly critical now that we shape the architecture of sustainable development
in a way that best achieves the objectives of economic growth, social development
and a secure environment. After thirty years of passionate effort, much well-guided
but plenty misguided, as well as some success and no small amount of abject
failure, it is worthwhile to take stock of the ideas that gave birth to sustainable
development, trace their evolution, and most importantly, to test their assumptions.
The interdisciplinary challenge of sustainable development has remained bounded
by prevailing normative political and economic assumptions marked by
ambivalence and hostility toward solutions based on human freedom. These
accepted conventions have weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union, including
the moribund notion of central planning. Over the last decade, however, the
growing appreciation for the productive power of human freedom and democracy
has frayed the orthodoxy. Consequently, now is a promising time in which to
engage in a fresh conversation to redefine modalities of sustainable development.
A. Development Paradigmsand the Global Orthodoxy

This is the story of how the progressive idea of freedom as the dispositive
ingredient in human development slowly crept from the corners of polite debate on
sustainable development to challenge the orthodox view. Along the way, unlikely
allies including Democratic and Republican presidents in the United States, the
Pope, a labor leader in Poland and a dissident in Burma, all converged to engage
6. Mark F. Imber, The Environment and the United Nations, in THE ENVIRONMENT AND
on the
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 138 (John Vogler & Mark F. Imber eds., 1996); See Declaration

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. G.A. Res. 1514, Dec. 14, 1960 (Doc
A/RES/I 514/XV) at 66-67 (1960) and International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, Nov. 30, 1973 (Doc A/RES/3068/XXVIII) at 75-77 (1973).
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the orthodoxy and enlarge the idea of democracy as a development norm.
Ironically, the very global institutions that should have been at the forefront of
this campaign were absent from its inception and are even now not entirely
committed to the enterprise. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the United Nations (UN) only recently have begun to nod in the right
direction. Their progress has been slow. Much of the hard work and immense
resources funneled through these organizations over previous decades has been
wasted, entwined in the grip of banal approaches to development.
Historically, the discourse of sustainable development has congregated
around a number of discrete themes springing from environmentalism and central
economic and social planning. The environmentalists' view that economic growth
is destructive to the environment was popularized by the Club of Rome study,
Limits to Growth.7 Grandiloquent French and German "meta-narratives" which
sought to reshape man and redesign society remain in vogue in modernization
theory, even after the fallacy of central planning lay threadbare. The redistribution
of wealth from the North to the South is a product of world systems theories, and
still a common feature in sustainable development.
The remainder of Part I discusses the history and maturity of the orthodoxy of
sustainable development. Part II turns away from the orthodoxy to explore the
interrelationship between democracy, economic growth, ecological sustainability
and regional security. The research suggests not just casual linkages among them,
but strong correlations, and even causality. Some of this research is new and
exciting and not well known; some is older but perhaps mostly ignored by many
because it does not complement the accepted paradigm. Liberal democratic
government is the fulcrum on which these concepts pivot.
The conclusion, Part III, advocates unapologetically for embracing economic
and political models of human freedom in pursuit of development. It is imperative
that we seek universal acceptance of the democratic development norm. It will be
especially challenging to dismantle the orthodoxy. The global sustainable
development movement is populated with a membership that shares a common
mind-set. Challenges to the conventional wisdom are excluded or rationalized as
mistaken. This article joins the few voices beginning to emerge from outside the
paradigm; thus, it has somewhat the quality of an outsider looking in.
While research suggests that everyone is susceptible to falling into the
cognitive coherence trap, what political scientists call "groupthink, ''8 asking people
to "consider the opposite" reduces this tendency significantly. 9 This article adds
value to the debate on sustainable development by asking those tied to the
orthodoxy to consider an alternative vision. This case for action is the functional
7. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF

ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972) [hereinafter LIMITS TO GROWTH].
8. See generally Irving L. Janis, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES ( 2 d ed. 1982).

9. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making,
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 544 (2004).
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opposite of much of the prevailing thought. In the words of the eminent historian
Arthur Schlesinger, there is value in intruding upon the "curious atmosphere of
assumed consensus."' 0 Doing so better informs the discourse and draws choices
into greater contrast.
By comparing the research about poverty and economic growth, the
environment, and regimes and war, we begin to give shape to an inductive model
for realizing sustainable development. That model shows that regime type is the
best indicator of a country's ability to progress toward sustainable development.
Liberal democratic regimes constitute the most effective systems for achieving
sustainable development.
B. Realism, Liberalism and Waltz "sImages
This analysis is necessarily interdisciplinary, involving a conversation among
comparative politics, international politics, economics and law. Louis Henkin
remarked once, "[t]he student of law and the student of politics.., purport to be
looking at the same world from the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems
unfortunate, indeed destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each
other."'" Integrating international relations theory and comparative politics into
international law offers particular value.
Over the last decade, the prospect that interdisciplinary scholarship can
calls for such
produce durable findings seems to have produced more clarion
12
across
Working
methodology.
combined
of
collaboration than actual examples
challenges,
special
poses
demarcation
of
lines
methodological and conceptual
causing some to abandon the task altogether. Prominent scholars say the divide
cannot be bridged. In mapping the terrain, Professor Greenberg of Stanford Law
law and
School refers to the two opposing world views in international
3
to
According
reconciled.'
be
cannot
they
suggests
and
relations
international
the
and
law
of
rule
the
emphasizes
which
internationalism,
Greenberg, liberal
centrality of the individual, and realism, which focuses on the struggle for power,
are mutually exclusive.14
Realism informs the foundation of international relations, and Greenberg
argues it is the polar opposite of liberal internationalism, to which international law

THAN THE
10. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER

SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 37
FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES,

(2004).

Praeger,
11. Louis Henkin, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (New York:

1968).
12. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335-411 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
205-239
InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
(1993);

AND
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

on
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOOLBOX I (Charlotte Ku and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Acad. Council
http://www.acuns.org.
at
available
1998),
Papers,
&
Rep.
Sys.
U.N.
the
13. Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1802 (2003).
14. Id.
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is secured.' 5 Combining the two approaches is akin to intellectual warfare, with
scholars on both sides willing to ignore or ridicule the other. Professor Greenberg
writes, "[t]hese opposing visions suggest a fundamental dialectic in human thought
and culture. This dialectic is our inheritance. It cannot be 'resolved'."' 6 This article
takes exception to that fatalistic conclusion. Both realism and liberalism reflect
some part of the complex world in which we live. In the cause of global
sustainable development, the risks of inaction, or of failure, are so great, and the
opportunities and potential for success so compelling, that we are driven to
leverage both perspectives.
One of the chief influences of realist political theory to this charge is found in
Kenneth N. Waltz's profound exegesis on the causes of interstate conflict, Man,
the State and War.' 7 Waltz approached his study of locating the cause of war
through three "images" or lenses-the individual, the state and the international
system. 18 According to Waltz's first image, the primary locus of the most
important causes of war resides in the aggressive, selfish and foolish nature of
man.
Second image analysis attempts to discern whether the causes of peace and
war are products of good and bad states and their governing regimes. 2 0 From the
vantage of Waltz' second image, the focus of progressive policy should be on
changing the present condition or character of states and their governments.
Sovereign states make their way in an anarchic world system, and Waltz's
third image posits that warfare is an inevitable consequence of their journey. In
classic third image analysis, Thucydides wrote that the cause of the Peloponnesian
War was, "the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm this inspired in
Sparta," which made war inevitable. 21 Although Waltz invested heavily in the third
image to explain international warfare, he also argued that no single image was
adequate to understanding international problems of war and peace. 22 It is
particularly fruitful to keep in mind Waltz's heuristic of three images in
considering the matter of global sustainable development.
Since World War II, many government bureaucrats, academics and activists
involved with Third World development 23 occupied the intellectual ramparts of the
15. Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?,5 INT'L SEC. 5, 8 (1999).

16. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 1804. Professor Greenberg prefers sustaining a "plurality of
voices" in order to fend off realist critiques of liberalism to preserve the dominant "efficacy and
influence of liberal international law discourse." Id. at 1803-04.
17. KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 12 (1954).
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 165.
20. Id. at 114.
21. THUCYDIDES, BOOK I, para. 23, § 6, reprinted in THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 16 (Robert B. Strassler, ed., 1996).

22. WALTZ, supra note 17, at 158-161.
23. This article focuses most closely on areas that comprise the "Third World."
World" ("Tiers Monde" in French) was initially coined by the French demographer
1952 as an analogy from the "third estate." The third estate described the commoners
and during the French Revolution. The term was adopted by twenty-nine African and

The term "Third
Alfred Sauvy in
in France before
Asian nations at
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second and third image of Waltz's paradigm. Immediately after 1945, and
extending into the contemporary period, development thought moored to the world
system level of analysis and the state level of analysis. Together, the two images
have comprised the theoretical template for international development.
Although the second image is the most fruitful level of analysis for
sustainable development, most conventional second image analysis has gone
astray. Second image analysis acknowledges the controlling function states and
regimes play in the process of sustainable development. Government institutions
and the decisions of governing elites are strongly correlated to development. The
error in the conventional second image approach, howe ,er, is in the belief that
authoritarian regimes are preferential to (and certainly no worse than) democracies
in achieving development.
It is startling to recall that for decades this was the more liberal component of
the development orthodoxy. This approach was espoused by modernization
theorists in the 1950s and 1960s based on the apparent development successes
inside the communist bloc. It is disconcerting to note that this image has grown
more influential since the fall of the Berlin Wall, first because of the rise of the
Asian "tiger" economies. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese economic
miracle emerged as the most recent example; its greatest spokesperson is Lee Kuan
Yew, the former leader of Singapore.
The third image relies on a world systems approach to development. The
individual theoretical approaches within the world systems paradigm center on
neo-Marxism, neo-colonialism and structural dependency. Ironically, each of these
approaches emerged from Western thought, although they imbibe a rejection of
other Western approaches to development. Systems theories seek to explain
development in terms of powerful social or historical systemic forces that shape
the global structure, producing development for some countries while precluding
development in others. These approaches are popular in the Third World because
they commemorate a sense of independence, and assuage feelings of anger and
resentment left over from the experience of colonization. The dispiriting status of
permanent victim, however, has made this approach unsatisfying, even if going
through the motions has proved therapeutic.
The intellectual confluence of second and third image dynamics forms the
durable, but amazingly counterproductive, global sustainable development
orthodoxy. While third image theoretical architecture has been overbuilt, solutions
based on second image analysis have been woefully underexploited. The obstacles
of economic growth, poverty reduction and ecological well-being are
the Conference in Bandung, Java, Indonesia, in 1955, and came to denote those nations neutral to the
ideological divide during the Cold War. See The Asian Language, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 5, 1999, at 70.
Because the nations of the Third World encompass an immense diversity of culture, economic
development, and natural resources, as well as political systems, the term "Third World" is an
incomplete, if not inaccurate description. Sometimes, however, the term is useful shorthand for
describing nations with greater similarities than difference, particularly in relation to the more
developed nations. On the Third World as a collective, see generally, John Ravenhill, The North-South
Balance of Power, 66 INT'L AFF. 731 (1990).
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fundamentally political; they properly reside within the second image and can only
be fixed by democratic state regimes.24
C The World System Image-Dependency Theory
The term "international development" did not acquire solid currency in
foreign policy until World War II. In thinking about the aftermath of the war at a
reception in June of 1942, U.S. Vice President Henry A. Wallace remarked to
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov that industrialization and
improvement of nutrition in "India, China, Siberia and Latin America" would
prove to be one of the greatest challenges of the post-war order.2 5 Molotov
concurred. 26 But international development never became a shared East-West
enterprise; the East went its own way. While the theory and practice of
development was shaped not by the East-West divide, but by the North-South
relationship, the terms of the debate-autocracy and world system
dependency-were inherited from Karl Marx.2 7
In Europe, the field of development economics emerged from the post-war
work of intellectuals such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, Tibor
Scitovsky and Albert Hirschman. These men were influenced largely by Keynsian
economics and ascribed to a general disdain for commercialism and markets. Their
ideas were infused with a romantic illusion of the potential for rapid economic
development through authoritarian planning. Consequently, early approaches to
international development coalesced around government-directed solutions. The
major focus was finding prescriptions for market failure, and analysis tended to
ignore the catastrophic effects of authoritarian government in sabotaging
development. 28 This early work laid the foundation for the ambivalent view of
regime type and institutions of governance which informs sustainable development
to this day.
At the time, there were a few dissenting voices, but they were pushed aside.
In 1951, for example, the UN published the UN Report on the Economic
Development for Under-developed Countries.29 The publication, which was
roundly criticized after its release, declared flatly that, "economic progress will not
occur unless the atmosphere is favorable to it. The people of a country must desire
24. LARRY DIAMOND, STANFORD INST. FOR INT'L STUDIES, CTR. ON DEMOCRACY, DEV. & THE

RULE OF LAW, MOVING UP OUT OF POVERTY: WHAT DOES DEMOCRACY HAVE TO DO WITH IT?

1(,2004), availableat http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20669/Moving_Up Out of Proverty.pdf.

25. JOHN TOYE & RICHARD TOYE, THE UN AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: TRADE,
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 17-18 (2004).

26. Id.
27. H. W. ARNDT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 36-39 (1987). Arndt

argues that it was another historical figure, Sun Yat-Sen of China, who first used the term "economic

development" in the modem sense of the term when he published his book, THE INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA in 1922. Id. at 16.
28. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7

(1992).

29. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AFFAIRS,, MEASURES FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, U.N. DOC. ST/ECA/10, U.N. Sales No. 1951.II.B2 (1951).
-.
or a

contemporaneous analysis of the report, see S. Herbert Frankel, United Nations Primer for
Development, 66 Q.J. ECON. 301-326 (1952).
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progress, and their social, economic, legal and political institutions must be
favorable to it. 30 The claim that "economic progress depends to a large extent on
governments of appropriate administrative and legislative action," 31 was
as implying that a lack of success in development displayed
immediately attacked
32
a lack of social will.

From the late-1940s until well into the 1990s, neo-Marxist models had a
powerful and often controlling impact on development thought. These models
largely focused on problems within the international system; one consequence was
the emergence of international development law. 3 3 The first major milestone in this
progression was the UN Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
1964.34
The conference was held in Geneva, and was attended by governments
representing three billion people. In classic Marxist metaphor, it was characterized35
as a summit of collective bargaining between the nations of wealth and poverty.
For many, UNCTAD "exploded the myth that all countries are economically
equal. 36 The cause of underdevelopment lay outside, not within the borders of
individual states. Underdevelopment reflected basic structural differences in
economic and social organization, development and bargaining power; the system
should accommodate those differences in order to iron out inequalities. The theory
was that fundamentally, the global system was based on domination and
exploitation between industrialized countries and developing countries. Since the
global system is organized and enforced through international law, if only
international law could be changed, then the system could finally begin to heal.
Once the cause of underdevelopment is removed, development naturally will
occur.
As would become typical of the mega-conference, little was actually
accomplished at UNCTAD 37 other than the venting of pejorative references to a
"new order" by Third World representatives." 38 Undersecretary of State George W.
Ball, the U.S. representative to the conference, privately lamented, "less-developed
victims of a high-class confidence game conducted in
countries have been the 39
elegant economic jargon."
Lavish theories of dependency and world systems support the belief that

30. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AFFAIRS, supra note 29,

23.

31. Id. at . 39.
32. See Frankel, supranote 29 at 325-26.
33. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15

(Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn, eds., 1987) (exploring trends in the theory and practice of development
law) [hereinafter SNYDER & SLINN].
34. G.A. Res. 1995, U.N. GAOR, 19" Sess., 1314th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/1995 (1965).
35. In Geneva, Global Collective Bargaining,NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1965, at 25.
36. Diego Cordovez, The Making of UNCTAD: InstitutionalBackground and Legislative History,
I J. WORLD TRADE L. 243-44 (1967).
37. TOYE & TOYE, supra note 25, at 205.
38. Id at 201.
39. Id..
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international economic dependence breeds the "development of
underdevelopment. ' '40 Dependency theorists argue foreign economic interests
inside the developing state and foreign capital inflows into the developing state
originating from the outside distort balanced and independent development. 41 The
theory was captive to ideology which assumes foreign ownership of production
constitutes foreign control of the country, and that such ownership automatically
illustrates a global structure of domination by the core on the periphery. 42 Still,
dependency theory rose to dominate discussions in the 1960s and 1970s. If these
models were not completely accepted among Western political economists, they
were not firmly rejected, either. John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in a study in 1962
that, "... the most prominent fact about the very poor country is not that it has free
enterprise industry or socialist industry, but that it has no industry at all." 43
Dependency began to lose its allure only toward the end of the 1970s, as the
passage of time provided greater data for statistical analysis which disproved the
hypothesis that foreign capital impedes economic growth. 44
During its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s, the ideology was angry, fueling a
particularly vitriolic and messianic approach which held capital markets and the
developed world in bitter contempt. The acrimony of the North-South divide in the
UN General Assembly was leveraged 45 in order to gain concessions from the
developed world. The result was an emphasis on paternalistic, global socialism
which reached its pinnacle with the campaign to establish a New International
Economic Order (NIEO).
The NIEO was a product of the Group of 77 (G77), which was established
when developing countries signed a compact at the end of the first session of
UNCTAD to express unity and begin a dialogue to address structural inequalities
in the global economy. 46 In 1967, G77 adopted the Charter of Algiers at a
preparatory meeting for the second UNCTAD conference, which was scheduled
for New Delhi in 1968. The Charter set forth the grievances of G77, and included a
plan of action to restructure world commodity pricing, development financing and
the expansion of world trade.47 For the first time, the Charter of Algiers sought
discrimination in the global trading system wherein less advantaged states would
40. Christopher Chase-Dunn, The Effects of InternationalEconomic Dependence on Development
and Inequality: A Cross-NationalStudy, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 720, 720 (1975).
41. See generally ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR
REVOLUTION (1969); Chase-Dunn, supra, note 40.
42. Christopher Chase-Dunn,, Reply to Stumpp, Marsh and Lake, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 604, 604
(1978).
43. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 18 (1962).
44. Mark Stumpp, et al., The Effects of InternationalEconomic Dependence on Development: A
Critique, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 600, 603 (Aug. 1978).
45. Howard R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, WORLD POLITICS INTHE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
231 (1965).
46. Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switzerland, Jun. 15, 1964, available
at http://www.g77.org/Docs/Joint%20Declaration.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
47. First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77: The Charter of Algiers, Algiers, Algeria, Oct.
10-25, 1967, availableat http://www.g77.org/Docs/algier%/7E 1.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
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be granted more favorable terms.
In 1970, the UN General Assembly announced the Second Development
Decade, invoking apartheid, colonialism, and the "occupation of territories of any
State ' 8 as the essential obstacles to development. The resolution reiterated the
language included in the Charter of Algiers that primary responsibility for
development resided with the developing states, and it adopted some sensible
measures, such as encouraging the reduction in tariffs among developing
countries. 49 The resolution, however, contained other provisions for developed
states to transfer, by 1972 and annually thereafter, 1% of their gross national
product to the developing world. 50 Those states that were already meeting that
quota were encouraged to envisage an even greater direct transfer of wealth. A
special session of the General Assembly was conducted in April and May of 1974,
at which member states were called upon to study the problems of "raw materials
'
That session produced the Declaration on the Establishment
and development."51
5
of the NIEO. '
With the NIEO declaration, the feeling that the international system was in a
state of severe imbalance was running at a feverish pitch. The solution was to erect
a new order based on sovereign equality, equity and interdependence, "irrespective
of their economic and social systems." 53 The declaration affirmed that vestiges of
racism, apartheid, foreign occupation and "neo-colonialism in all its forms" served
as the main impediments to development. 54 Announcing unity among developing
countries as a source of new global power, in "all fields of international activity,"
states in
the declaration also called for full and equal participation of developing
55
community.
international
the
of
decisions
applying
and
formulating
The declaration also demanded preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for
developing countries in international economic cooperation. 56 The proponent
governments, mostly dictatorships and other sundry autocrats, declined to make
distinctions among regimes and economic systems, unapologetically valuing the
right of "every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems most
and not to be subjected to discrimination of
appropriate for its own
57 development,
any kind as a result."
The principles set forth in the NIEO resolution of 1974 were codified by a

48. Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 2626,
25th Sess., 1883d mtg., 5 at 40, U.N. Doc. A/8124 (1970).
49. See id. at I .
50. Id. at 42.
51. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th
Special Sess., 2229th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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complementary Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.58 The charter put
NIEO into operation by permitting nationalization and expropriation of multinational corporate property, with compensation paid in accordance with "all
circumstances the [expropriating] State considers pertinent., 59 Controversies over
expropriation would be settled by the tribunals and the domestic laws of the
nationalizing state. Further, every state inherited a right to benefit from advances
in science and technology to promote its economic and social development, which61
meant that productive economies should subsidize those that were unproductive.
measures to provide
Finally, the charter mandated that developed nations expand
62
states.
developing
to
treatment
favorable
more
and
special
For all its indignant protest, many felt that the declaration and charter did not
go far enough. These hard-liners argued NIEO represented complicity with a
corrupt capitalist-dominated international system. 63 One alternative solution was to
take inspiration from the socialist countries' concept of collective autonomy by
disengaging from the world system. 64 Developing countries could escape from
permanent status on the periphery by setting up their own detached system.
a new "sovereign space" or
Disengagement from the global system would generate
6
parallel international system for developing countries. 5
By the inauguration of the Third UN Development Decade in 1980, little had
changed. The pronouncement for the Third Decade simply borrowed language
from the Second; the centerpiece of development was in restructuring the world
system, which was in disequilibrium. The solution was now familiar-redoubling
the effort to establish a NIEO. 66 The declaration for the Third decade, however,
evinced greater sophistication than earlier work. 67 The World Bank and the IMF
were encouraged to conduct their affairs in a way that would accommodate
developing nations' strategies. Stable international exchange rates and currencies
were sought. 68 Developed states were urged to control rampant inflation, which
had a precarious effect on development. 69 In a nod to reality, the target for
development assistance from developed states fell from 1.0% to70 0.7% of gross
domestic product by 1985; the goal of 1% was deferred indefinitely.

See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29th Sess., 235th mtg.
U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281/XXXIX (1974).
Id.
Id. at 52, art. 2.
Id.
at 53, art. 13.
Id.at 54, art. 18.
63. SNYDER & SLINN, supra note 33, at 17-18.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id.
66. Intemational Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, G.A.
Res. 35/56, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., at 106, U.N. Doe. A/35/56 (1980).
67. Id. at 120.
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id. at 108.
70. Id. at 108, 113.
58.
at 50-55,
59.
60.
61.
62.
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71
The next milestone was the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in
1986. In many ways, it typified global development talk by looking to developed
states to provide the Third World with their "inalienable human right" to
development. 72 But the document was original and profound in other ways. First,
it recognized that the human person, and not the state, should be the subject and
beneficiary of development.73 Second, although the declaration continued to
expound NIEO language, it acknowledged for the first time that developing states
74
While this standard
had a duty to formulate appropriate development policies.
surely was vague, the door was now open to the importance of national policy in
development. It was the first glimmer into the "black box" of the state for
international development theorists, and a long-overdue recognition that regime
type, national economic systems and social modalities mattered.

Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, however, the NIEO model persisted.
One fuming neo-colonialist assessment which succinctly illustrates the stale state
of the paradigm was expressed by an African from Cameroon in 1991:
[I]nstead of development, it is my view that we are in the most vicious
stages of colonization. The so-called development strategies are ways to
exploit the riches of Africa. For industrialized countries, Africa is a vast
plantation, a huge market, innumerable sales points, an immense
dumping ground, a place for leisure, and a reservoir of labor and jobs.
She will therefore have to produce raw materials and export them to the
industrialized countries for pittance; and she will get so much poorer by
purchased at incredibly high prices
consuming manufactured goods
75
from the very same countries.
The view is enduring, indicating that the depth of dependency theory and the
powerful narrative it invokes. In 1996, Philip Shabecoff, a former reporter for The
New York Times who served as historian to the Rio Earth Summit, said, "There can
be little doubt that the industrialized nations of North America, Europe, and Asia,
which control the lion's share of the planet's wealth and power, also bear the major
responsibility for inequitable distribution of its wealth, degradation of the
76
For
environment and heightened political tensions between North and South.
many today, world systems analysis extracted from Waltz's third image still holds
the key to understanding under-development.

D. "Fixing" the World System: The Era of the Mega-Conference
Once one accepts that development is caused by certain systemic world
71. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41, arts. 1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
72. Id.
73. Id.at 186-87
74. Id.
75. PHILIP SHABECOFF, A NEw NAME FOR PEACE: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALISM,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 54 (1996) (quoting Louisa Tappa, Theology of
Environment and Development, in SONED ON UNCED, A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CRISES 64(1991)).

76. Id.
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problems, it is inescapable to seek globally-mandated solutions. Globalism may be
described as the increasingly dense network of intercontinental and international
connections among state and non-state actors, mediated through the flow of
people, culture and ideas, information, goods and services, capital and basic
materials and raw resources. 77 Economies are globally interconnected, but the
temptation to search for global mandates often ignores local and state problems. In
considering global governance, many writers and practitioners fall into error
searching for global solutions and
global government. Hedley Bull referred to this
78
trap as the "domestic analogy."
Domestic governance is so familiar that it is exceedingly tempting to hope
that the state order experienced in the developed world can be easily stretched to
encompass the globe. The sustainable development movement in particular has
been prone to succumb to the domestic analogy, in which local and state problems
are addressed in sweeping, but ineffective fashion, through global action. For
example, the UN Development program's Human Development Report 1999:
Globalization with a Human Face, illustrates how development theorists and

practitioners cling to the fatigued model of global government, while ignoring
policies that would enhance sustainable development. 79 That report advocates
transforming global governance architecture by creating a global central bank and
a world investment trust to redistribute wealth. 80 A two-chamber assembly would
be structured to allow global representation of civil society. 81 Global advocates
claim, "[N]o single country or group of countries, however powerful, could
effectively solve the problem." 82 Over the long
run, the report envisions "global
83
federalism"--a genuinely global government.
In his opening speech at the first UNCTAD more than forty years ago, U.S.
Undersecretary of State George W. Ball attempted to strike a note of realism into
the gathering. Instead, his presentation was received by many
in attendance as
84
paternalistic-and some regarded it as hostile "negative blast.
The bitterness from the early days of international economic development was
fused with a parallel strand of environmental activism. If UNCTAD ignited
modern discourse on global economic development, it was Stockholm that did so
for global environmental protection. A "greening" of development economics
77. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 1-4 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue, eds., 2000); see also, U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 1999: GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE (1999)

[hereinafter, GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE].
78. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 46

(1977).
79. See generally GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 77.
80. Id. at 111.

81. Id.
82. RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 4 (1998).
83. Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 362-63 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue, eds., 2000).
84. TOYE & TOYE, supra note 25, at 202.
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occurred in the 1970s, 85 and ecology would become formally fused to economics
in the 1980s to create the term "sustainable development." The merger did not
mature as ideology until the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The alliance
between the proponents of Third World development and Western environmental
activists would come to sustain anti-globalism into the 1990s. By the time of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002, it
was evident that the alliance was unraveling.
Although the era of the mega-conference began at UNCTAD in 1964, it was
not recognized as a new phenomenon until Stockholm in 1972. The age expired in
Johannesburg, where malaise captured the mood. The mega-conferences that were
features of this thirty years' expanse each served as powerful political symbols to
transmit the message of the orthodoxy. During the heyday, they served as focal
points to crystallize sentiment and strengthen the movement. The conferences are
remembered fondly by their participants as things accomplished, and opportunities
lost.
Political scientist Harold D. Lasswell wrote in his study of political symbols
that in non-democratic societies, the insistence of a ritual of action-such as the
86
conduct of elections-serves as a central symbol and reassures conformity. In
such cases, discourse becomes highly stereotyped. The sustainable development
orthodoxy was caught up in this phenomenon. Measures of effectiveness were
gauged by the number of treaties and signatories, and the expressions of good
intention, rather than by the consequences flowing from compliance and
enforcement. The symbols became ornamental features of discourse at grand
summits in exotic locations, sometimes resulting in edifying signing ceremonies.
Lasswell wrote, "[b]y elaborating the trappings of an oracle, the ocular message
becomes87a pronouncement that takes on an authoritative nimbus of mystery and
weight."
In 2002, the WSSD in Johannesburg signaled the end of an era and the demise
of expectations organic to the lavishly overwrought conferences. In the decades
between Stockholm and Johannesburg, a cadre of entrenched UN and international
bureaucrats, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials and
academicians had become steeped in the orthodoxy. It is axiomatic to regard the
time between Stockholm and Johannesburg as a sort of "golden age" of
88
enlightened cooperation on the environment and development. There is a sense
that the early recognition of environment degradation embodied in Stockholm
deteriorated after the 1970s, and that chief responsibility for this condition lies
85. SCULLY, supra note 28, at 7-8.
86. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, ET AL., THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SYMBOLS: AN INTRODUCTION

24(1952).

87. Id. at 24.
88. Frederick A. B. Meyerson, Burning the Bridge to the 21" Century: The End of the Era of
Integrated Conferences?, 9 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT 6, 10 (Spring

2003), available at http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF23C.pdf (last visited Sep. 21, 2004). The
Environmental Change and Security Project is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars in Washington, D.C.
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with the developed nations.

Conference participants comprised a global network constructed from
alliances of likeminded representatives who share the same epistemological
assumptions. 9° Pursuing common goals, they delivered countless interventions at
the negotiating table and fashioned grandiose agreements, often with the effect of
advancing their careers. 91 The perpetual mobilization, coordination and technical
review embodied public diplomacy that skirted uncomfortably close to conflicts of
interest.92
1. Stockholm-NGOs Get a Seat at the Table
During the 1960s, many began to realize that ecology would touch all aspects
of our lives, and that the environment would affect every comer of society. The
quality of the natural environment quickly became associated with quality of life in
a multitude of ways. In 1968, the UN General Assembly recognized the connection
between the quality of the natural environment and human rights. 93 The resolution
set the stage for thinking about the environment in social and political terms,
although many of the ensuing prescriptions would prove wildly ineffective. That
same year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2398, which proposed to
convene a UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 for the purpose of
creating a framework within the UN
for "comprehensive consideration" of the
94
problems of the human environment.
Writing before the conference, economist Barbara Ward and the
microbiologist Ren6 Dubos captured the alarming, if not apocalyptic, prognosis of
the times:
The two worlds of man-the biosphere of his inheritance, the technosphere of his creation-are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep

conflict.... This is the hinge of history at which we stand, the door to
the future opening to a crises more sudden, more global, more
inescapable and more bewildering than ever encountered by the human
species....95

The Stockholm Conference met from November 5-16, 1972 and was the first
global intergovernmental conference dedicated solely to environmental issues. It
was attended by 113 states, including two heads of state. It concluded with the
adoption of a declaration which avoided specifics and instead found its influence
89. SHABECOFF, supranote 75, at 51.
90. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN. AFF. Sept.- Oct. 19, 1997, at
183.
91.

PAMELA

S.

CHASEK, EARTH
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ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 224 (2001).
92. FEN OSLER HAMPSON & MICHAEL HART,, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: LESSONS FROM
ARMS CONTROL, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 349 (1995).

93. Problems of Human Environment, G.A. Res. 2398, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1733dmtg. at 2

(1968).
94. Id.
95. BARBARA WARD & RENt DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF A
SMALL PLANET 16 (1972).
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of
and authority in tone, and in its celebratory dedication to establishing basic rules
97
96
the
principles,
general
26
Embodying
law.
environmental
international
Stockholm Declaration was hortatory in its essence, but with the distinct hope that,
like the UN Declaration on Human Rights that preceded it, it would assume
98
increasing authority. The power99 of the declaration was in its role as one of
Lasswell's symbols of inspiration.
Fundamental Principle 1 set forth in sweeping aspirational language the key
to the Declaration. It would have been a timeless statement on the condition of
man but for the addition of neo-colonial aura which quickly dated it:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and bears solemn responsibility to protect and
improve the environment for present and future generations. In this
respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation,
discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign
domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.l1°
Some delegates thought it more desirable that the Declaration start with an
apolitical and general affirmation of every human's "right to a wholesome
environment."' 0' This right already was recognized in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 10 2 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICCPR). 10 3 In the end, more politicized language prevailed. The Tanzanian
the principle to
Amendment, later endorsed by twelve African states, wanted
' 4 Other states felt
racism.
and
denounce "expansionism, apartheid, colonialism
05
the political language was extraneous.' In the end, a compromise was reached,
effort to shape the text.
their
in
with the Africans largely successful
The Declaration condemns certain forms of government abuse that deny
fundamental human rights, but the categories mentioned are vastly under-inclusive.
More general language indicting all autocratic forms of government and
government failure would have been more accurate, and more helpful, in a text
with such august aspirations.

INT'L L. J.
96. Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
423, 513-15 (973).
U.N. Doc
97. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
on the Human
A/CONF.48/14, 11, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972) thereinafter Declaration
Environment].
98. Sohn, supra note 96, at 513-515.
99. Id. at 428.
100. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 97, at Part II, Principle 1.
101. Sohn, supra note 96, at 452.
A/810
102. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25(1), U.N. Doc.
(Dec. 19, 1948).
(XXI), art.
103. International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
1966).
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11(1), U.N. Doc.
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The global environmental movement gained sophistication and energy in the
early-1970s, and learned to effectively exercise political power in Western Europe
and North America. The groups made their mark at Stockholm. The Conference
signaled a shift away from the state-centered negotiation of previous international
environmental treaties and toward UN-centered negotiations. 10 6 This increased the
07
influence of the UN Secretariat and NGOs.1
Stockholm marked the first major foray by the global environmental
movement into international politics, 108 and it propelled NGOs into a permanent
place in international policy-making. 109 Principle 25 welcomed them to the table
by calling on states to ensure that international organizations play an "efficient,
coordinated and dynamic role."" 0 As a consequence, the goals of some of the
negotiations became disconnected from the states that would implement the
provisions, creating instruments that were unworkable."' This phenomenon would
incubate throughout UN conferences for thirty years, becoming painfully obvious
to NGOs and states alike only at Johannesburg.
At the time, Stockholm was seen as a major success in infusing language
concerning the environment with a new social and political content. What was
perhaps most interesting about the Declaration is that it gave rise to a sense that the
international community-by force of good will, public opinion and
activism-could penetrate the sovereign shell of the state and drag it toward
emerging normative aspirational goals. The declaration generated an optimistic
ambiance of international cooperation, and the bold confidence displayed in the
text was a powerful catalyst for generating change. In retrospect, one of the most
important observations to emerge from Stockholm was that most environmental
problems in the Third World were caused by under-development. Unfortunately,
this key tenet has been virtually lost among the cacophony of causes vying for
2
attention in the world environmental movement. 1
A side meeting at the conference concluded that development not only solves
the crises of human poverty, but also is an effective mechanism for environmental
conservation. The meeting included only about 30 participants to the Stockholm
Conference and met in Founex, Switzerland, located outside of Geneva. The group
produced a report which suggested economic development was the only realistic
method of achieving ecological protection."1 3 Unfortunately, contrary views
expressed at the conference had greater influence in shaping international
106. Oran R. Young, Perspective on International Organizations,in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 244, 250 (Gunnar

Sj6stedt, ed. 1993).
107. Some of the more state-centered negotiations were the London Convention (1972), the
MARPOL Protocol (1978), CITES (1973) and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (1979). CHASEK, supra note 91, at 223-24.
108. Sohn, supra note 96, at 513.
109. SHABECOFF, supranote 75, at 39.
110. Declaration on the Human Environment, supranote 97, at pt. II, principle 25.
111. Young, supra note 106, at 251.
112. Declaration on the Human Environment, supranote 97, pt. I, para. 4.
113. See THE FOUNEX GROUP, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE FOUNEx REPORT 3-5
(1971).
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environmentalism. Abhorring economic development, some viewed economic
growth as the cause of environmental degradation, rather than a possible cure. This
approach cautioned against the pursuit of development, not just because it
inequalities, but because it endangers the Earth-and the
perpetuates structural
14
all.'
us
of
safety
The Club of Rome's Limits to Growth is the most articulate exposition of the
5
116
latter approach."1 Published in 1972, Limits to Growth worried about the world
growth.
finite limitations of economic and societal
against
bumping up
Continued economic growth eventually would precipitate a "sudden,
17
Limits to Growth argued that Earth
uncontrollable collapse" in global ecology.
of equilibrium, all input rates, and
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of capital, must be minimized."
investments
and
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models of
As late as 2000, the Club of Rome was still talking about Malthusian
' 19
holocaust."
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impending
an
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2. The Brundtland Report-'Sustainable' Development
By the end of the 1980s, there was worry that nations had strayed from the
multilateralism of Stockholm, and there was a push to recapture the waning spirit
of global environmentalism. In writing the Chairman's Foreword to his report,
former Norwegian Environmental Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland pleaded that a
120
He argued12 1that the
return to multilateralism was the "most urgent task today."'
cooperation.
global
in
deterioration
seen
had
1987
and
1972
between
years
122
Modern usage of the term "sustainable development" emerged from the
and Development (WCED).
Report of the World Commission on Environment
The WCED was established by the UN General Assembly in 1983 with a mandate
to re-examine critical assumptions on the environment and development. The title
of the report was, Our Common Future.Referred to as the Brundtland Report, the
final document of the commission was delivered to the UN General Assembly in

1987.123

The report defined "sustainable development" as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet

TO GLOBAL FAITH
114. GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS
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123. Id. at xv.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 34:2

their own needs.' 24 Significantly, the report acknowledged a commitment to
economic growth based on "policies that sustain and expand the environmental
resource base."' 125 The report also took sides on the duel between the Founex
Report and Limits to Growth by recognizing that economic growth was essential to
26
turn back deepening poverty in the developing world. 1
The Brundtland Report represented a clear break from the idea that
environmental problems had become so unmanageable that the only way out was
to stop development through zero-growth solutions. Instead, the report realized that
"[m]any essential human needs can only be met through goods and services
provided by industry... 2 7 The report said the terms "environment" and
"development" were "inseparable," placing the two, for the first time, on equal
footing. 128 The report was much more optimistic than its predecessors, concluding
that "humanity has the ability to make development sustainable.' ' 29 Departing
from the Limits to Growth, it claimed that the concept of sustainable development
does not imply limits; present limitations were elastic and could be remade through
30
advances in technology'

and social reorganization. 131

The report also rejected the inevitability of poverty, calling it an "evil in
itself."' 132 Population growth and the high proportion of young people throughout
the Third World meant that there was a larger labor force seeking jobs, and the
agricultural sector could not absorb all of them. 133 Industry was called on to
provide employment, and to deliver consumer goods and material comforts. The
new goal was to fulfill the burgeoning rise in human needs and expectations
through economic development. Limits to Growth was repudiated.
Despite recognition of the importance of markets, the Brundtland Report
retained components dependency theory baggage, and in some ways this
reinforced the development orthodoxy. Employing Waltz's third image, the report
perpetuated neo-colonial solutions. It advocated a vertical, top-down focus to force
global systemic repair, stating that the basis of exchange in world trade must be
rebalanced to satisfy developing countries. Moreover, the report ignored the most
important lessons that would emerge from second image analysis-that a nation's
political regime often determined the level of development.
124. Id. at 43. The term "sustainable development" as a sociopolitical concept is thought to have
originated from a 1980 IUCN report, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY (1980), and popularized by
Lester R. Brown's book, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (1982).
SEGGER, ET AL.,
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WEAVING THE RULES FOR OUR COMMON FUTURE: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND
PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW 11-13 (2002) [hereinafter
WEAVING THE RULES].
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3. The Earth Summit at Rio
The next major milestone was Rio. Ninety heads of state attended the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, in 1992.134 The Earth Summit was the first major international conference
after the Cold War and the apex of optimism. Maurice Strong, who was appointed
the event, "the most important
Secretary-General, had high hope, billing
135
convened."'
ever
international conference
By the time of Rio, the international environmental movement had moved
from the periphery to the center of decision-making. Their presence further
deepened political rifts. The four preparatory committees (PrepComs) became a
virtual combat zone as blocs of countries and NGOs worked to fashion the
capstone documents, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.136 By the Fourth
PrepCom, dispute and deadlock characterized every single document, chapter,
137
Whereas the NGOs had a place at the table at
paragraph, comma, and period.
Stockholm, at Rio often they were driving the agenda. For the first time, NGOs
participated in substantial numbers to shape the program. There were over 1,000
38
accredited organizations at the table. Since many of them lacked familiarity with
slowed negotiations considerably.'
the labyrinthine UN negotiation process, they
139
Even when
Many organizations had militantly sharp and competing positions.
Barbara
strategy.
and
style
language,
over
divided
they
they agreed in substance,
rancor:
the
captured
Federation
Wildlife
Bramble of the National
[W]hen we talk about 'reallocation,' we mean a good thing-like taking
away fiscal incentives to cut down rain forests for cattle ranches. They
use the word to mean a bad thing-taking current official development
aid and re-labeling it for the environment. We are asking for reforms of
financial institutions. They are just asking for more money. They don't
know that in the United States, 'wise use' is a code for the destruction
of natural resources by big corporations. The split is a mile wide and 60
miles deep. 140
Bringing NGOs to the forefront of negotiation was part of an enlightened plan
134. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and

Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/REV.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 13, 1992).

135. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 128.
136. Id. at 142.
137. Id. at 146.
138. Id. at 149.
139. The prevalence of some more extreme positions inspired more than 250 scientists world wide,
including 27 Nobel Prize winners, to issue the "Heidelberg Appeal," a letter to heads of state attending
the conference to resist the "irrational ideology which is opposed to scientific and industrial progress,"
impeding economic and social development. They contended, "a natural State, sometimes idealized by
movements with a tendency to look to the past, does not exist and has probably never existed since
man's first appearance in the biosphere, insofar as humanity has always progressed by increasingly
harnessing Nature to its needs and not the reverse." Beware of False Gods in Rio, WALL ST. J., Jun. 1,
1992, at A12.
with Barbara Bramble
140. SHABECOFF, supra note 75, at 150 (Interview conducted by Shabecoff
in March 1992).
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to nurture civil society. The central assumption was that the organizations were a
critical segment, perhaps the most critical segment, of civil society because they
engage in democratic processes and could challenge the state. 4 1 At least in some
cases, this assumption appears questionable. The organizations generally held
strong and narrow views, serving to Balkanize the negotiations. In some countries,
participation by broader groups may have been more representative and effective
at building civil society. In South Africa, for example, a social movement, rather
than advocacy organizations, brought down apartheid. 42 The sanctimonious
behavior of some of the groups at Rio created pause about their expansive role.
Shifting power to vocal, savvy, unelected, well-funded and well-organized
advocacy groups actually could diminish public representation by empowering
special political interests.
The summit was a massive affair, hosting 100 heads of state and 178
countries. Rio is a party city; outside the meetings, the event produced a carnival
atmosphere populated by a camp-following of anarchy. The summit even featured
a rock music concert and had its own theme song. 143 In contrast, the level of
seriousness sometimes was palpable, as normal logistical decisions about the
summit acquired greater meaning. In the final days of planning for the event,
organizers were forced to make a fateful decision between ensuring present
comfort and risking future environmental well-being. Planners finally decided in
favor of cooling the conference with potentially ozone-depleting air conditioning,
leading the Wall Street Journal to question whether "AC is PC."' 44 The choice
served as a metaphor for the decisions made at the negotiating table.
Of the five major agreements to emerge from the conference, the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21145 were the most comprehensive. The composite Rio
Declaration formed a short statement of sustainable development. Principle 4
declares, "in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it.' 146 Of the few human rights dispensed in the
141. Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Toward Civil Society Realism, in FUNDING VIRTUE:
CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 295 (Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, eds.

2000).
142. Marina Ottaway, Social Movements, Professionalizationof Reform, and Democracy in Africa,
in FUNDING VIRTUE: CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 77, 95 (Marina Ottaway &

Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000).
143. Robert S. Greenberger, North-South Split: With Cold War Over, PoorerNations Face Neglect
by the Rich, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1992, at Al.
144. Thomas Kamm, Rio Eco-Fest: Some Big Problems Await World Leaders At the Earth Summit,
WALL ST. J., May 29, 1992, at Al.
145. Agenda 21 is a blockbuster 40-chapter volume spanning 800-pages of goals and potential
programs outlining sustainable development for the world. The full text of Agenda 21 is available on

the Internet website of the UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2l/english/agenda2ltoc.htm. (last visited May. 19,
2006).
146. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development June 3-14,
1992,
U.N.
Doc.
A//CONF.151/26
(I)
(Aug.
12,
1992),
available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51 /aconfl 5126- I annex I .htm.
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declaration is entitlement to a "healthy and productive life in harmony with
essentially meaningless.147
nature," in Principle 1, a standard so vague as to be
The rather lengthy Principle 10 alludes to a right of access to the public of
148
a right that is not unimportant, but
information concerning the environment,
tangential to the far more critical rights delineated years earlier at Copenhagen as
part of the Helsinki Process.
The declaration preserved dependency themes developed in the heady days of
the NIEO. Principles 2 and 3 assure states that they have the "sovereign right to
indicating
exploit their own resources," as though that idea were in dispute, while
' 149
6
Principle
"equitably.'
fulfilled
be
that the "right to development" should
to
priority"
"special
and
consideration"
resurrects the call for giving "special
50
of the preference. 1
developing states, without ever defining what the scope
Overall, the gaping deficit of the Rio Declaration is a lack of any mention of
democracy or the rule of law, let alone anything so avant garde as a right to own
property or enter markets. Curiously, it even omits the usual amorphous neocolonial euphemisms for democracy, such as human freedom and selfdetermination. Working in the shadow of the Copenhagen Document, these
omissions only typify the sway that third image themes-systemic neo-colonialism
and dependency-held over much of the global body politic.
4. Millennium Goals, But Not Means to Achieve Them
Eight years after Rio, at the time of the Millennium Summit in New York in
early September, 2000, democracy had gained currency. In the intervening years,
a host of democracies had emerged throughout the world. Some of these
democratic states, materializing from decades of communist dictatorship, were
particularly strong voices for human freedom and the rule of law.
During this time in the United States, the Clinton Administration had settled
into an unapologetic but sensitive campaign of democracy promotion throughout
the world. Months before the summit, in June of 2000, the Council for a
Community of Democracies was launched in Warsaw, Poland, with 106 member
governments. 15' The combination of these events refreshed the global normative
foundations of liberal democracy.
The Millennium Declaration was an omnibus template for addressing the
52
The document was
world's greatest challenges over the next fifteen years.'

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

151. Michael J. Glennon, There's A Point to Going it Alone: Unilateralism Has Often Served Us

Well, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2001 at B2. Among democracies throughout the world at the time, France
was the sole unilateral hold-out to participating at the founding of the Community of Democracies in
Warsaw.
152. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th Plenary
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
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divided into eight sections.' 53 Democracy, which should be a central theme of the
entire document, is inexplicably absent from sections II, III, and VI, which address
peace and 54
security, development and poverty reduction, and protecting the
vulnerable. 1
Section I contains some brief, hortatory language about freedom, but it is not
a direct reference to liberalism as a system in which the individual has rights
enforceable as against the state. 5 5 Rather, the section calls for freedom from
hunger, freedom from fear, freedom from oppression and freedom from injustice,
an amorphous directory of aspirations. 5 6 Still, the declaration declared,
"democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best
assures these rights."' 157 In section V, the declaration asserted that "no effort" will
be spared to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, and it resolved to
strive for "civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all."' 5 8 While
those aspirations are essential, section V, unlike all the other sections, is devoid of
detailed requirements and specific objectives. 59 The opportunity to enlarge the
boundaries of democracy and the rule of law into the realm of sustainable
development was squandered.
The accompanying 80-page report, We the Peoples'6° failed even a single
mention of democracy in its chapter on governance. In fact, amazingly, the report
of the UN Secretary-General mentioned democracy only once, saying,
"Democracy, once challenged by authoritarianism in various guises, has not only
prevailed in much of the world, but is now generally seen as the most legitimate
and desirable form of government."' 161 It is remarkable that the Millennium
Declaration, which endured the process of negotiation and compromise in the
General Assembly, has far stronger language about democracy than the feckless
book prepared for the summit by the UN Secretariat and released under the
signature of the Secretary-General. Publication of We the Peoples presented an
optimal opportunity for the Secretary-General to make a strong and detailed
statement about democracy, but it was not seized. In the first annual report on
62
progress of the Millennium Declaration, there were signs of improvement.
Democracy was mentioned 13 times, but the citations were rote and democracy

153. These sections are: I Values and Principles; II Peace, security and disarmament; III
Development and poverty eradication; IV Protecting the environment; V Human rights, democracy and
good governance; VI Protecting the vulnerable; VII Meeting the special needs of Africa; and, VIII
Strengthening the United Nations.
154. United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra note 152.
155. Id. at sec. I.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at sec. V.
159. Id.
160. Kofi Annan, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 2 1s" CENTURY
(United Nations 2000), (http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm) (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
161. Id. at 68.
162. Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the United Nations
Millennium Declaration,U.N. GAOR 57th mtg, U.N. Doe. A/57/270 (2002).
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certainly was not central to the text. Democracy was never invoked with effect;
on a menu-peace, security,
rather, it featured as just one malleable aspiration
163
democracy, development and human rights.
To obtain greater relevancy, the Millennium Goals should have emphasized
the value of increasing political and economic freedom. By 2000 it had become
clear that markets already had lifted much of the developing world out of poverty.
Primarily as a benefit of greater political economic freedom, global human poverty
had decreased dramatically over the previous fifty years. Incomes had risen nearly
throughout the entire world since 1950, when the per capita income of the average
inhabitant of Earth was only $1,872. By 1990, per capita income world-wide had
leaped to $4,292.164 Of course, much of the increase came from strong growth in
the developed states, but even the poorest countries improved substantially. In
China, per capita income rose from $470 in 1961 to $1,324 in 1990. In India, it
rose from $559 in 1961 to $1,262 in 1990; both nations have experienced even
greater growth since then.
Many regions, however, were unresponsive. From 1990 to 1999, the number
of Africans living in extreme poverty-living on less than $1 (U.S.) per day-was
barely reduced from 47.7% in 1990 to 46.7% in 1999.165 In order to have a realistic
chance of meeting the goals of the Millennium Declaration of cutting poverty and
unemployment in half by 2015, the countries of the African Union must generate
66
economic growth rates of 7% or greater. 1 Establishing aggressive goals is
laudable; indeed, anything less is immoral. But the Millennium meeting never
bridged the chasm between goals, and the economic and political freedoms that
could serve as the means to achieve them.
5. Johannesburg, the World Summit & 'Conference Fatigue'
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in
Johannesburg South Africa, in 2002, ten years after UNCED in Rio de Janeiro. The
event included over 100 heads of state and nearly 25,000 governmental, business
and NGOs centered at the Sandton Convention Centre and sprinkled at side events
throughout the city. The goal was not to forge a new agenda or introduce new
Agenda 21.167
treaties, but to move toward a strategy for implementing
163.

Implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary General, UNGA

57/270, Jul. 31, 2002, UN Doc. A/57/270 (2002).
164. Adam Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND
WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990 272 (2000), hereafter, Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT.

165. SADC Executive Secretary Says Africa Has 'Little Hope' of Achieving Millennium
Development Goal, JOHANNESBURG SAPA (SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS AssoC.), Jun. 12, 2003 (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Document. Id. No. AFP 2003612000112, reproduced from original
publication at www.sapa.org.za) (Copy on file with author).
166. Juliette Bastin, Desperately Seeking Employment, PARIS JEUNE AFRIQUE L'INTELLIGENT 7475 (Sep. 5, 2004), African Growth, Development, Fight Against Poverty Said Dependent on
Employment (Trans., FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, Document. Id. No. AFP
20040926000001) (Copy on file with author).
167. Paul Wapner, World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a Post Jo-burg
Environmentalism, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 1-2 (Feb. 2003).
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Unfortunately, the conference never gained the momentum to accomplish that
goal, and instead disintegrated into a series of ad hoc affairs.
The event marks the end of the age of the mega-conference.
Environmentalism was under siege, engaged in a desperate fight to prevent a
weakening of existing agreements. 168 Like past summits, much of the business at
the conference was shrouded in the Byzantine system of UN parliamentary
procedure and played out in hallways and side rooms. For the first time at such a
conference, there was an effort to reach beyond the bureaucracy and NGOs and
invite business interests to the table. 169 The businesses were judge fairly
exclusively by their "green pedigree, rather than a more balanced assessment that
could have included the value of the jobs and the benefit of the products they
produced. The assessment was one dimensional, and the outreach effort that
included business interests and the value of economic growth only undermined the
unity enjoyed at prior conferences.
Part of the problem with Johannesburg was that even the firmest believers in
the conference believed there was very little that was new to discuss. The UN had
held a major conference each decade going back to UNCTAD, and a less elaborate
conference nearly every year in the period between Rio and Johannesburg, so the
ground was fairly well tilled. By the time of Johannesburg, the world community
was suffering "conference fatigue,"' 170 as the glaring gap between the rhetoric of
"law in the books" and the evident failure of "law in action" widened.
The mega-conferences were becoming momentary media events. Although
they continued to serve as powerful symbols for the true believers, for the rest they
were disintegrating into "sound-bite opportunities without lasting effects on
policies or the quality of the environment." 171 It was no wonder that prior to
Johannesburg, the chairman of the summit remarked that it likely would be the last
of its kind.172 It had been a long road from Stockholm.
Despite the prominently placed corporate exhibits at Sandton, such as a
sparkling, high-technology BMW pavilion, the summit was unable to escape
inherent disconnects from its orthodox roots. While First World leaders and NGOs
spoke about the environment, many Third World leaders focused on economic
173
growth and free trade, assailing rampant Western agricultural protectionism.
Lebohang Ntsinya, the environment minister of Lesotho, argued, "the whole
'sustainable' concept is an invention of the affluent, whose prosperity allows them
a margin for mistakes or acts of nature. In Africa, there is no margin, and so [we]
168. Powell is Jeered as Divided Summit Comes to an End, WALL. ST. J., Sep. 5, 2002, at A12
(2002 WL-WSJ 3405271).
169. Jeffrey Ball, At Environmental Summit, UN Fails to Shed Cloak of Secrecy, WALL. ST. J.,
Sep. 4, 2002, at A18 (2002 WL-WSJ 3405149).
170. Comments of Daniel Magraw, Symposium: The Road from Johannesburg, GEO. INT'L L.
REV. 809, 839 (Summer 2003).
171. Peter M. Haas, UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment, 8
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 73-91 (2002).

172. Meyerson, at 6, supranote 71.
173. Editorial, Third World Wisdom, WALL. ST. J., Sep. 3, 2002, at A20 (2002 WL-WSJ 340941).
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74
The
can't afford to put nice-sounding adjectives in front of... 'development'.'
conference adjourned with most participants, including your author, greatly
disappointed.

E. The State Image-Rethinking Modernization Theory
Explanations of sustainable development resident in Waltz's second image
are much more accurate and more powerful than deductive third image models.
But most of the prevailing second image analysis on sustainable development is
stubbornly at odds with the empirical evidence. Cognitive psychology helps to
explain why this is so. When people sort through issues of daunting complexity,
they tend to reconstruct them into easy and simple models. In the words of Graham
Allison, they reflect "assumptions about the character of puzzles, the categories in
which problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are relevant and
the determinants of occurrences."' 175 These themes, moreover, serve as a mutually
reinforcing and collective basket of beliefs which perpetuate a paradigm.
The problem is that people who hold strong views on one subject are far more
likely to distort evidence in seemingly unrelated areas that support or cohere with
that belief, even while perceiving that they are exercising objectivity in their
analysis.176 The strength of the initial belief has a strong and positive correlation
with the magnitude of distortion on the evidence that follows. 177 This makes it
particularly important that we separate what has worked in sustainable
development from what has failed by subjecting policy biases to empirical testing,
when possible.
Introducing outside perspectives can raise issues that otherwise would be
overlooked, averting disaster. During President Kennedy's attempted invasion of
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, for example, the administration conducted its
operation without consulting outside perspectives. The same people who planned
the operation were the ones who were asked to evaluate it. 178 The operation
quickly became embroiled in failure, the result of a bizarre neglect to consider the
popularity of Fidel Castro, the strength of the Cuban Army, the size of the island
and the number of troops required for a successful operation.' 79 In order to prevent
reoccurrence of this sort of thinking, the military now conducts war-games in
which friendly forces are pitted against an opposing, well-positioned and
174. Id.
175. Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crises, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
689, 689 (Sep., 1969).
176. This phenomenon is explained by cognitive coherence in psychology. People assimilate
evidence into coherent models. For example, psychological studies indicate that people with strong prodeath penalty attitudes were more likely to convict a defendant than people with anti-death penalty
attitudes, who are more likely to acquit. Of course, the question of guilt and the punishment are
unrelated cognitive exercises, but people have a general tendency to make the two "fit." Simon, at 542,
supra note 7. "[M]ental modes of the evidence and beliefs cohered with the corresponding verdicts, so
that people with strong pro- or anti-death penalty attitudes interpreted all the evidence in the case in a
way that cohered with conviction and acquittal, respectively. Id.
177. Id. at 545.
178. Surowiecki, WISDOM OF CROWDS, at 37, supra note 8.
179. Id.
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intelligent "red team."' 80 The red team's job is to find fault and exploit weakness in
the plans and operations of friendly forces. The red team startles the complacency
at work in groupthink-which occurs not so much because dissent is being
censored, but because alternative paradigms are understood by everyone within the
system to be improbable.' 81 Subsection E of Part I, infra, discusses the dominant
second image paradigm in development thought, which is modernization theory.
Part II, infra, offers the outside perspective-second image analysis rooted in
liberal democracy and human freedom.
1. Economic Preconditions for Democracy-Lipset
Second image theories of modernization originated in the European fascist
dictatorships of the 1930s, and were given modern currency by academics and
officials in developed countries and in post-colonial Africa, Asia and Latin
America. 182 One of the earliest thinkers in this regard is the eminent political
sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset. In 1959, Lipset argued that economic
development increased the general level of education, which then enabled
democracy by advancing changes in political attitudes and advancing political
culture. 83 Lipset's research on the relationship between democracy and
development had a colossal effect, generating the largest body of academic
research of any topic in comparative politics. 184 More importantly, his work
influenced the course of modernization and development policy in the decades
since, affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people across the globe.
Lipset compared data on proxies for economic development, including per
capita income, education and levels of industrialization, with regime types in
Europe and Latin America. 185 In each country, the indices of wealth-including
income, but also the number of physicians, motor vehicles, radios, telephones and
newspapers per capita-were higher in democratic states. 186 There were sharp
distinctions on all indicators of development between democratic and authoritarian
governments, and these results were valid throughout the range, with the most
democratic states being the wealthiest and the least democratic states being the
least wealthy.
The strong correlation between democracy and high levels of educational
achievement convinced Lipset that education was a necessary precondition for
180. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment, 17 JOINT FORCE Q. 4749. (Autumn/Winter 1997/1998)
181. Surowiecki, at 37, supra note 8. See also, Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d. ed. 1970).
182. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46,
49 (Jan. 1992).
183. Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 69-105 (Mar. 1959).

184. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theory and Facts, 49 WORLD POL.
155-183, at 156 (1997). Over the years, Lipset's work has been "supported and contested, revised and
extended, buried and resuscitated." Przeworski, et. al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT at 79, supra,
note 131.
185. Lipset, at 74-76, supra, at note 150.
186. See, Table II, Id. at 76.
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democracy to flourish. 87 In poorer democracies, he argued, populism and corrupt
leaders manipulate the masses and divert national energies into unproductive
endeavors. Lipset concluded that democracy could thrive only in states that
successfully created a rising middle class. Economic growth immunizes the
population against the appeal of anti-democratic radicalism, especially class and
ethnically-based ideologies. 188 These findings suggested that states first must
develop economically before they can think about democratizing. Lipset launched
remains a powerful doctrine of state-centered
the "development first" thesis, which
189
day.
this
to
development
economic
2. Modernization Theory-Huntington
Lipset's theory was extended by the distinguished political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington. In his classic 1968 study, Political Order in Changing Societies,
Huntington asserted that autocratic regimes were better than democracies at
90
governing low-income countries because they maintain order.' In less developed
1
institutions.1 9
unifying
as
served
states, dominant political parties and the military
Huntington was a regime agnostic, declaring the most important political
distinction among countries was not their form of government, but their degree of
192
government and the regime's ability to establish order. The real divide among
regimes, he contended, was between effective governments in the United States
and the Soviet Union, for example, and ineffective governments in Asia, Africa
193
and Latin America, where the political community was fragmented. Huntington
downplayed the differences between democracy and dictatorship, arguing that both
embodied94 consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness and
stability. 1
In a later study on political participation for the Agency for International
Development, Huntington outlined the parameters of a "technocratic model" of
development. In this model, "[p]olitical participation must be held down, at least
95
Political participation
temporarily, in order to promote economic development.'
187. For example, the only Middle Eastern country that was a democracy, Lebanon, also had the
highest levels of education, with literacy at about 80%. Id. at 80. "Given the existence of povertystricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated pyramid class structure, and the 'premature'
triumph of the democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and
Africa are bleak." Id. at 101.
188. Id. at 83-84. See also, G. John Ikenberry, Why Export Democracy?, 79, 82 in STRATEGY AND
FORCE PLANNING (Security, Strategy and Forces Faculty, Naval War Coll., eds., 4"' ed. 2004).
189. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, Why Democracies Excel,
83 FOR. AFF. 57, 57-58 (Sep./Oct. 2004).
190. Samuel P. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 8 (1968). "History shows
conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine,
improving health, expanding national product, creating industry, and maximizing welfare. But the one
They may
thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority .....
not provide liberty, but they do provide authority." Id.
191. Id. 198-208.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id.at 2.
194. Id. at 1-2.
195. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, NO EASY CHOICE: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
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96
was merely a by-product of development, rather than an independent goal.
Increases in the socio-economic level were believed to encourage higher levels of
political participation, and more diverse and complex forms of political
participation. 197 These findings helped to develop the basic assumption of
modernization theory, which is that there is a trade-off between democracy and
98
development. Generally, dictatorship is needed to generate development.

Societies advance along a single linear plane, with the attainment of democracy but
the final facet.' 99 The emergence of democracy would be an inexorable
consequence of the latter stages development. Dictatorship generates development,
and development eventually leads to democracy. The best route to democracy
was
20 0
long and circumspect, passing through the theater of authoritarian rule.
Modernization theory convinced many that the countries of Western Europe
became democratic only after passing some opaque threshold of economic
development-generally measured in per capita income. 20 1 The search was
on-and continues to this day-to define the precise level of per capita income at
which democracy takes root. Spain was considered a typical case. Madrid
experienced rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Only in the 1970s,
after experiencing industrialization and urbanization, was Spain considered ripe for
the transition to democracy. By the early 1980s, however, two-thirds of middleincome states had reached or surpassed the generally accepted threshold for
development of per capita income of $300-$500 (in 1960 dollars). Despite this,
most of them had not become democratic. The facts did not fit the theory, so the
threshold was raised and the theory was altered.20 2
Looking at the South American experience of having undergone economic
development, but only to turn toward autocracy, Guillermo A. O'Donnell argued
that the strains of economic liberalization and development, and particularly the
dislocations caused by import substitution, actually produced longer-lasting
authoritarian rule. 20 3 This new variant of the theory suggested democracy in poor
countries breeds economic stagnation and civil unrest. 204 In this rather unforgiving
view; democracy itself was the problem. Huntington argued that the apparent
relationship between poverty and under-development on the one hand, and
political instability and violence on the other, is spurious.20 5 "It is not the absence

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 23 (1976).

196. Id. at 167.
197. Id.
at 166.
198. Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND
199. Id.

DEVELOPMENT, at 3, supra, at note 131.
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201. Jonathan Sunshine, ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOCRACY: A STUDY IN
HISTORICAL STATISTICS (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), as cited in Samuel P.
Huntington, Will Countries Become More Democratic? 99 POL. SC1. Q. 193, 200 (Summer 1984).
202. Huntington, Will Countries Become More Democratic? at 200, supra, note 168.
203. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 3-15 (1973).
204. Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and Morton H. Halperin, THE DEMOCRACY
ADVANTAGE: How DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE 3 (2004).

205. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER INCHANGING SOCIETIES, at 41, supra,at note 157.
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20 6
it which produce political disorder."
of modernity but the efforts to achieve
20 7
Modernization is the cause of violence.
At best, modernization theory suggests democracy is neither good nor bad,
but rather neutral.20 8 Hitler came to power within a democratic process, and the
Bolsheviks came to power amid a broad and liberalizing upheaval in the czarist
such
order. Modernization theory was open to the idea that struggling democracies
20 9
as India, Kenya and Brazil could be caught in analogous circumstances.

In the end, modernization theory contends neither democracy nor
development generates stability, and political development can only be successful
after decades of ponderous social and economic progress under the direction of a
dictatorship. 21 Although the "development first" theory has suffered recent
setbacks due to new empirical research, it remains influential and has experienced
a revival in recent years. 21 ' The resurgence of modernization theory is rooted in the
success of the Asian "tiger" economies, and the economic rise of China, in
particular. The Asian-inspired adjunct to modernization theory is constructed
around the idea that economic development is best pursued under the tutelage of a
"benign" autocracy.
3. "Benign" Autocracy as an Adjunct to Modernization Theory
Former Singaporean premier Lee Kuan Yew often extols the virtues of his
model of autocratic development. His central notion is that autocratic government
is more disciplined than democracy. Internecine political battles inherent to
inimical to development, crippling decision-making and generating
democracy are
212
public chaos.
Even some classic economists accept economic and political spheres can
remain separate superficially. Milton Friedman observed, "[i]t is... clearly possible
to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political
arrangements that are not free." 21 3 Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain,
Imperial Japan and even Tsarist Russia all featured capitalism as the primary
means of production. Up to a point, market mechanisms can be grafted on to an
authoritarian state, although none of the historical examples suggests that such a
"free" economy would provide a satisfactory level of economic growth. The new,
"benign" autocracies, however, would assert they are different.
206. Id.
207. Id. Huntington argues that not only does social and economic modernization produce political

instability, but the degree of instability correlates to the rate of modernization. Id. at 45.
208. Robert D. Kaplan, A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first
Century, JEROME E. LEVY OCCASIONAL PAPER, ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD ORDER NUMBER
2, at 6 and 9 (U.S. Naval War College Aug. 2001).
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211. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 16 (Jan. 2002).
212. THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1994 at 15. See also, Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny, A
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(Mar.-Apr. 1994) (1994 WL 13290253).
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Look at China today. Through the force of its astonishingly high level of
economic growth, China has inserted itself into the center of the development
debate. China is now the major engine for intraregional trade, with enormous
growth in exports and imports for Asia. 214 Following in the path of the Asian
"tigers" and their export-driven economic growth strategies of the 1970s, China's
economy is increasing at a breathtaking annual rate of more than 9%.215 Living
standards have continued to climb even after two decades of impressive gain. In
2003, household incomes in China increased more than 9% in urban areas 'and
more than 4% in rural areas. 216 In recent years at least some authoritarian states
have done rather well economically. How do we account for the development
miracles of the "benign" autocracies?
First, for every development miracle, there have been several grandiose
authoritarian projects that have ended in catastrophe, with dictators stealing and
murdering on a massive scale. 217 It is true that the Asian tigers have tended to be
dictatorships, but it is also the case that dictatorships generally have not tended to
be tigers. 218 As a rule, autocratic governments have wrought untold misery. "Even
the economic collapse of communism pales in comparison with the destruction
caused by dictatorships in many African countries, or the squandering of resources
in the Middle East, or the havoc spawned by military governments in Central
America. ' 2 19 Second, we cannot be certain whether a free mainland China would
have experienced even higher growth at the beginning stages of its economic
trajectory. China started from such a low level, and it is still so poor, that quick
gains are not unexpected. Moreover, after being artificially held back for so long, it
is no wonder that the talents and industry of the Chinese people produced
explosive growth once the yoke of communism was lightened.
Third, autocracy comes with its own price that exacts a cost on human
security and well-being, undermining the whole point of development. If
development is achieved at the cost of countless lives ruined and even destroyed
by autocratic government, then the goal has been sacrificed for the means. If Lee
Kuan Yew is the global representative for "benign" autocracy, prominent Burmese
human rights dissident Aung San Suu Kyi is his intellectual opponent. She has
used her influence to admonish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) countries for privately invoking the adage that democracy represents a
Western value. "To the contrary, democracy simply means good government
rooted in responsibility, transparency and accountability. No authoritarian system
can assure good government because there is no accountability. The government

214. Asian Development Bank, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 4-6 (Oxford University Press,
2004). Exports from other Asian nations to China grew at an annual rate of almost 17 % from 1995-

2003, more than three times the world average. Id. at 5. China also was the export leader in Asia in
2003, with more than a 40 % increase in exports. Id. at 12.
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id. at 42.
217. Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, at 4, supra, at note 131.
218. Id..
219. Id.
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can get away with whatever it does."

220

Fourth, if the objective is to achieve sustainable development, where the
economy and ecology co-exist and the goal is a wealthy and liberal society, then
the rosy assessment of authoritarian economic growth only shows part of the
picture. In many authoritarian states, the environmental bills have yet to come due.
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), created by the World Economic
Forum in collaboration with research centers at Columbia University and Yale
University, rates nations with the best and worst environmental index score. All of
best
the nations with the best ESI, as well as those nations displaying the
democracies.
are
time,
over
score
improvement in their
China's remarkable economic progress belies its location among the bottom
222
few nations on the ESI. 21 Interestingly, the connection between democracy and the
environment appear to run both ways. Slipping from democracy to less freedom
Kong's
seems to threaten the environment. There is good cause to worry that Hong
22 2
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political
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new environmental activism that lead to greater government responsiveness
223
The same is true with India. While uncertainty over
environmental matters.
Chinese authoritarianism adds risk to its future environmental prospects, India's
democratic form of government reduces the risk to the environmental in that
country. 224 Democracies are more successful in their approach toward the
person
225
environment because they tend to promote a liberal view of the individual
environment.
natural
secure
a
enjoy
to
with a right, protected by the state,
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, authoritarian state power is anathema to
a healthy civil society. It prevents the formation of the rule of law and threatens
individual freedom, even in autocratic nations with expanding economies. A CIA
by
panel of independent experts recently concluded that states governed
than
worse
fare
will
likely
exclusionary political elites are much less stable and
pluralistic societies in the future. In such states, mostly spread throughout Africa,
civil
Asia and the Middle East, but also including Russia, Brazil, India and China,
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and minority rights are weak and power is not exercised in accordance with the
rule of law. 226 Over time, this corrosive effect will frustrate stability, as is evident
in China today, where the government fears protest easily could spin out of
control.
Authoritarian rule acts as a drag on every area of society and the economy
because it inhibits the proliferation of free ideas and hinders free association. For
example, an effective environmental movement is less likely in China than
Taiwan. Whereas Taiwan's government is responsive to public elections, the rulers
in Beijing are mostly concerned with the maintenance of political stability. The
typical response of authoritarian regimes to middle-class radicalism is repression,
not reform. Authoritarian governments realize that reforms that cater to the
demands of the rising middle class only increase their strength and radicalism,
rather than sating its demands.227
A classic example of this dynamic unfolded in the Dominican Republic in
1965. The Reid Cabral government was overthrown by an urban middle-class
insurrection only after it began to initiate serious reforms. The Cabral reforms
included reducing public corruption, expanding political liberty, and purging some
of the most oppressive elements in the military. 228 Yet it was, "precisely at the
moment of moderate upswing... that the revolution of April, 1965, broke out; it
seems ironic that Reid was ousted at least partially because of the reforms he began
to carry out. ' 229 The Dominican Republic highlights the dilemma faced by
autocracies-minimal steps toward reform merely remind the people of the basic
illegitimacy of the ruling regime. Because the regimes have no legitimacy, they
could implode quickly and unexpectedly.
Modernization theory still has wide appeal. In his influential book, The
Future of Freedom:Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, Fareed Zakaria

argues, "[t]he simplest explanation for a new democracy's political success is its
economic success-or, to be more specific, high per capita income. 2 30 He
contends that, with few exceptions, when poor countries become democracies,
those democracies die.
Zakaria also argues democracy was inappropriate, or even desirable, for many
of the emerging democratic states, such as Russia, Belarus and the Philippines. He
asserts these "illiberal" democracies are responsible for a "democratization of
violence." Such democracies, he contends, spread poverty, ethnic violence,
repression, and civil and interstate war. These charges generally are contrary to
empirical evidence supporting the "democratic peace," which is set forth in Part II.
226. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, at 4 2-46, supra, note 191.
227. Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES, at 373, supra, at note 157.
228. Id.
229. Howard J. Wiarda, THE CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1965 (unpublished paper, Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs, 1966) at 30-31, as cited in Huntington, POLITICAL ORDER
IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES, at 373, supra, at note 157.
230. Fareed Zakaria, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD

69 (2003).
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D, infra. This thinking perpetuates destructive myths about democracy, creating a
dangerous ambivalence or even hostility toward liberalization. It also keeps alive
the view, expressed more than a decade ago by the UN Development Program,
strategies can sometimes afford to be blind to
that, "growth-oriented
2 31
democracy."
Zakaria's claims also raise methodological challenges that help to prove the
point. The argument that democracy only flourishes at middle income levels is
difficult to test since few authoritarian states have achieved middle income status.
Since 1960, only 16 autocracies have had per capita incomes above $2,000. Of
these only six-Taiwan, South Korea, Spain, Portugal, Greece and,
debatably-Mexico-adopted democracy in the aftermath of economic
for full transition to
expansion.232 Moreover, if we accept $6,000 as the benchmark
democracy, it raises a troubling normative suggestion that "all but 4 of the 87
countries currently undergoing democratic transition, including233Brazil, Kenya, the
unfit for democracy."
Philippines, Poland, and South Africa, are
II. ENHANCING SECOND IMAGE ANALYSIS

There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer
has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders
in all those who would profit by the new order....
-Machiavelli

234

Over the last thirty years, an avalanche of empirical evidence has emerged
revealing that regime type and levels of freedom in a society control whether the
social order moves toward sustainable development. Governments with a high
degree of political freedom and a liberal democratic government and a market
economy are far more likely to achieve development success. Importantly,
economic development need not be purchased at the expense of the environment.
Liberal democracies actually promote better ecological protection and
environmental sustainability. Free societies also are more peaceful and develop
deeper and more extensive cultural, political and economic ties with one another.
Thus, freedom is interconnected to economic growth, environmental sustainability
and regional security, and each of these are mutually reinforcing. In the last five
years, the amount of information supporting the choice for freedom has become so
overwhelming, and the number of democracies growing so large, that we have
neared a "perfect storm" poised to overturn the development orthodoxy.
In Part II.A, infra, political freedom is discussed within the context of
OF
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GLOBAL
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development. Contrary to modernization theory, there is strong empirical evidence
that shows that democracy causes development. In Part II.B, the connection
between market freedoms and economic development is reviewed. Since the
emergence of the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s, the relationship
between markets and economic growth has become widely-although by no means
universally-accepted.
Part II.C reviews the impact of political and economic freedom on ecology
and environmental sustainability. While all societies now face the challenge of
delivering greater environmental protection, the evidence indicates that free
societies best promotes conservation of the natural environment. In contrast, states
governed by autocratic regimes, and those with low levels of political and
economic freedom, have the poorest environmental records in the world.
Finally, Part II.D reviews how free societies generate positive externalities
that buttress regional peace and security throughout the international system.
Sustainable development cannot occur in settings torn by conflict and war, so the
"democratic peace" generated by democracies is a particularly important
component for achieving global progress in the world's poorest neighborhoods.
Democracies tend to be more peaceful in their interactions with neighboring states,
engaging in more international trade and being far less likely to initiate aggressive
war. The benefits of the democratic peace, however, also extend to individuals and
their relationship to the state. National security and regional stability, as well as
human security and the individual's right to be free from fear of the state, are better
protected by democratic governments than autocracies.
A. PoliticalFreedom and Development
Many global development institutions now accept markets as an essential
prerogative for successful development, and the importance of economic freedom
to development is set forth in Part II.B, infra. Too often, the UN wanes agnostic on
the issue, but it is becoming difficult to disagree that markets are essential to
achieve development. Unfortunately, democracy has not realized the same level of
respectability, although it may be even more important than markets. As early as
1970, Dankwart Rustow published an incisive article in Comparative Politics in
which he warned against the futility of trying to discern "preconditions" for a
country's transformation to democracy. 235 He criticized studies that tended to make
broad conclusions from correlations between democracy and often external, but
even internal, economic, social, cultural and psychological factors, while ignoring
decisive political factors. 236 Nonetheless, an ambivalent view toward democracy
persists, even among many democracies. The U.S. Department of State, for
example, cited the Lipset-Huntington view that "economic development makes
democracy possible..." on its Internet website promoting democracy.237
235. Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, 2 COMP. POL.
337, 362 (1970).
236. Id. at 356-62.
237. See Howard Cincotta, WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? Chapter on Democratic Government (adopting
Huntington's thesis, Democracy's Third Wave) (online publication from International Information
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The democratization of much of the planet occurred through breaking waves
of liberalism. Democratic waves are periods in which groups of states transition
238
The first or long wave of democratization began
from autocracy to democracy.
in the early nineteenth century and ended in 1926.239 During that time span, which
extended nearly one hundred years, thirty democracies rose in North America,
dominions.240
Western Europe and certain overseas English
This long wave was reversed between the world wars, as autocratic
241
governments emerged in Europe and South America. The second, shorter wave
of democracy began after World War II, with the democratization of the axis
powers. 242 This short wave of democratization ended and the trend was reversed as
seized control in South America and the Mediterranean from
military governments
243
about 1958-1975.
The third wave of democracy began in 1974, rolling back many of the
setbacks experienced in the Mediterranean and South America. It expanded to Asia
in the 1980s.244 The third wave was propelled by the "grand failure" of the Eastern
spurred, by
246
bloc in the 1990s. 245 Democratic waves can be reinforced, or eveninstitutions.
global
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influence
the
and
system
international
liberalization in the
The achievement of democratic waves can also be reversed. For example, despite
the second wave, the world was no more democratic by 1984 than it had been in
1954.247
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Freedom emerged in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in Africa in the 1990s. In
1989, thirty of the forty-eight countries of sub-Saharan Africa were ruled by a
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military regime. 253 By 1995, there were only three regimes that were clear-cut
25 4
examples of military rule in the sub-Sahara region.
1. Defining Democracy
There are as many definitions of democracy as there are democracies. Some
might draw the circle of democracy so broadly as to include the jirga in
Afghanistan, the panchayat in India, the shoora in Islamic societies, the mawi
tiplutmamk among Native Americans, and countless other community forms of
dialogue and decision-making. 255 While any effort to achieve societal consensus
can be applauded as a move in the right direction, a thriving liberal democracy is
not simply the triumph of a majority or adherence to a culturally-sensitive tribal
authority.
The foundation for liberal democracy is at least a thousand years old. The
cardinal principle of the Magna Carta was the idea, just beginning to germinate in
England at the end of the first millennium, that freemen of the kingdom had rights
as against the government, and that those rights should be secured to them by laws
binding on the king. 256 Montesquieu, writing in Spirit of the Laws, distinguished
between what he termed limited regimes and despotic regimes.257 The two
traditions-English and French-finally became confused when they merged in
the liberal movement of the nineteenth century. 258 The differences would reappear
in the twentieth century as a conflict between liberal democracy of the English
tradition and social or rationalist democracy of the French.
The French revolutionary thinkers were optimistic about human nature,
believing in the power of intellectuals to rearrange society. 259 The English were
more pessimistic, seeking to design institutions that would control human
nature. 26 Though these two schools are now often lumped together, they
demarcate separate philosophical space. The English view, derived from Scottish
moral philosophers led by David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and
Edmund Burke, is essentially empiricist. 26 The French approach is informed by
the French Enlightenment and Cartesian rationalism. Its most celebrated proponent
262
is Rousseau.
Although democracies need not fit a specific model, the more successful
approach falls squarely in the English tradition. The English found the essence of
253. Id.
254. John A. Wiseman, NEW STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 1-2 (1996).
255. GLOBAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supranote 198, at 26.
256. MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES 6 (William D. Guthrie, ed., Columbia University

Press 1916).
257. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, 12-13 (Thomas Nugent & J.V. Prichard, trans., William
Benton 1952).
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freedom in spontaneity, organic growth in society and the absence of coercion; the
soul of the French approach lies in the pursuit and enforcement of an absolute and
263
While the English
collective purpose defined by doctrinaire deliberateness.
foundation
indispensable
the
laid
that
theory
valid
and
profound
a
formed
concept
of liberty, the French rationalist approach has been a disaster, leading many who
264
accepted it to the opposite of a free society.
The philosophical dichotomy was borne out in practice. By 1983, no former
French, Dutch or Belgian colony was rated "free" by Freedom House, yet several
265
Myron Weiner, writing at the time for the
former British colonies were.
American Enterprise Institute emphasized this point, "[E]very single country in the
Third World that emerged since the Second World War with a population of at
as well) with a continuous
least one million (and almost all the smaller countries
266
colony."
democratic experience is a former British
A liberal democracy requires its leadership to remain accountable through an
267
elaborate system of checks and balances. It also must be designed to keep the
people safe, not only from the horizontal hazards of each other, but from the
vertical hazards of the rulers. This is something the French philosophers never
understood. 268 This safety function is made even more difficult as it unfolds in the
process of public choice, as horizontal hazards between groups (for example,
competitive greed or spite) are converted into vertical hazards through transposing
private claims as coercive government action.
A central feature of democracy is an electoral component; democracy is a
system in which incumbent parties actually lose elections and leave office when
the rules dictate. 269 In the United States, Schumpeter emphasized the importance of
electoral competition as a cornerstone of the "democratic method" in his 1942
270
Robert Dahl describes
classic, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
indirectly accountable to
or
directly
either
participatory political systems as those 271
the people. Elections serve that function.
Liberal democracy goes beyond mere elections and consists of structures,
relationships and ideas that celebrate and promote individual liberty. The
individual is protected from predatory groups in society, and from voracious state
at 230.
263. Id.
264. Id.at 231.
265.

Myron Weiner, EmpiricalDemocratic Theory, in COMPARATIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 26 (Myron Weiner & Ergun Ozbudun eds., 1983), cited in Huntington, supra note 168, at
206.
266. Id.
267. Jon Elster, Accountability in Athenian Politics, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION 253, 263-64 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
John Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY,
268.
ACCOUNTABLITY, AND REPRESENTATION 329, 331 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).

269.

REFORMS
ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

1991);
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (Jon Elster & Michael S. McPherson eds.,
54.
at
131,
note
supra
PRZEWORSKI,

270.
271.

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269, 273
ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 2 (1971).

(1943).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 34:2

power. As a form of government, liberal democracy may be defined in terms of
three elements: (1) the source of governing authority (generally derived from the
will of the people); (2) the purpose served by government (generally, pursuit of the
common good); and (3) procedures for constituting the government (generally,
popular elections).272 These broader concepts of liberal democracy include a
citizens instilled with civic virtue, effective popular control of the organs of
government, transparency in government, equal opportunity to participate in
2 73
government and promotion of the rule of law.
Open societies possess a multitude of advantages over autocratic societies. An
open society promotes discourse on shaping public value preferences regarding
government policy. Open societies maintain a healthy tension among contending
political forces, moderating extreme views. 274 Freedom of association, assembly,
speech and petition encourage the formation of diverse interest groups. Because
these groups appeal to wide-ranging and conflicting views and interests, they come
to encompass and represent most people in society. The groups, in turn, serve in
aggregate to cement rather than fragment civil society because most individuals
will come to identify with more than one group. In contrast, in tribal societies,
individual allegiance is dedicated solely to the tribe, rather than spread among
competing interest group factions.
[T]here is some positive probability that any majority [will contain]
individuals who identify for certain other purposes with the minority.
Members of the threatened minority who strongly prefer an alternative
will make their feelings known to those members of the tentative
majority who also, at some psychological level, identify with the
minority. Some of these sympathizers will shift their support away from
the majority alternative and the majority will crumble.275
Democracies also leverage the pragmatic benefits that are a product of
tolerating dissent. 276 Dialogue creates the opportunity for public debate about
deeply held values of the good life, and this discourse and experimentation is more
likely to produce not only rapid economic progress, but also the stability that
comes with a moral consensus in society.277 This iterative process also helps
societies make better collective decisions.
[T]here's no real evidence that one can become expert in something as
broad as 'decision-making' or 'policy' or 'strategy.' Auto repair,
piloting, skiing, perhaps even management: these are skills that yield to
application, hard work and native talent. But forecasting an uncertain
future and deciding the best course of action in the face of that future are

272.

HUNTINGTON, supra note 205, at 6.

273. Id. at 9-12.
274. Lipset, supra note 150 at 97.
275. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 104-05 (1956).
276. Scott A. Beaulier, Is Discourse Relevant for Economic Development?, 8 INDEP. REV. 343,

345-46 (2004).
277.

Id. at 346.

2006

GLOBAL AND GOING NOWHERE

much less likely to do so.

278

planning must exploit vigorous national debate that
To be effective, complex
279
only comes from democracy.
The most comprehensive exposition of international democracy arose from
20
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 8 The CSCE was
a complex negotiating process involving all of the thirty-five original states to the
28 1
The Copenhagen Conference was
world's largest regional security organization.
nothing short of profound, achieving the most dramatic and far-reaching document
282
According to Thomas
on human rights and democracy ever concluded.
Burgenthal, a public member of the U.S. delegation, the Copenhagen Document
(Document) proclaimed a new public order based on democratic pluralism that was
283
Never before had the principles of
as important as the Peace of Westphalia.
political pluralism and human rights been laid out so explicitly or enumerated at
such length.
Among the more insightful points of agreement were these "elements of
justice" in paragraph 5 which were deemed essential to the full expression of the
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all human beings:
Free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret ballot;
The rule of law, which does not mean merely a formal legality which
assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement
of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full
acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality;
Genuinely representative government;
The duty of the government and public authorities to comply with the
constitution and the laws;
Human rights and fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by law and in
accordance with international law;
Legislation adopted at the end of a public procedure, and regulations
published;
Military authorities serving under, and accountable to, civil authorities;
Effective means of redress against administrative action of the state;
278.
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Independent judiciary and independent legal practitioners; and,
Extensive and neutrally applied criminal procedures.

284

The OSCE states also declared that the will of the people, freely and fairly
expressed through periodic and genuine elections, was the basis of the authority
and legitimacy of all government. 285 Paragraph 7 of the Document contains
detailed requirements for free and fair elections; including universal suffrage,
secret ballots, the right to seek public office and the right of the winner of the
286
election to enter office after the election.
Among the other rights guaranteed are the right of free speech and thought,
free assembly, free association, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to
organize. 287 Fleshing out these and the other enumerated principles in fine detail,
the Document represents not just the establishment of the post-Cold War order, but
a "Magna Carta for the internationalization of democracy." 288 Other international
declarations about democracy have since added weight to the emerging global
democratic norm, especially the Harare Declaration of the Commonwealth
States289 and the Warsaw Declaration,290 but Copenhagen was there first and in
greater detail. Moreover, by announcing that democratic gains were irreversible,
the Document abruptly turned Brezhnev Doctrine on its head.29 '
The Document was profound in one other sense. The preamble expressed the
conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedom based on the
rule of law and democracy is a prerequisite for the lasting order of peace, justice
and cooperation on the European continent. For the first time, the domestic order
was inextricably bound to the international order. This maxim lies at the center of
securing regional peace and sustainable development, and these linkages are
explored further in Part II.D, infra.
Scholars have developed various checklists to explain what triggered the
expansion of democracy in the 1990s, but there is a remarkable degree of
convergence on the most critical factors. Huntington and Przeworski, working
separately, both believe the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine by the Soviet
Union was a key variable in ending communist rule in Eastern Europe.2 92 Both
284. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of
the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307-09.

285. Id. at 1309.
286. Id.
at 1310.
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288. Professor John Norton Moore, Lecture: The Copenhagen Document, Toward the Rule of Law
and the Principle of Democratic Governance, University of Virginia School of Law, Nov. 29, 2004
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1991,
available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/intemal.asp?NodelD= 141099.
290. Toward a Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference: Final Warsaw Declaration:
Toward a Community of Democracies (2000), reprinted in ENHANCING U.S. LEADERSHIP AT THE
UNITED NATIONS 47 (2002) availableat http://www.ccd21 .org/articles/warsaw declaration.htm.
291. Charles Sampford & Margaret Palmer, The Theory of Collective Response, in PROTECTING
DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 28-31 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005).
292. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 205, at 44-45; ADAM PRZEWORSKI,
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scholars also cite "legitimacy crises" that eroded the authority of the Eastern
293
European communist regimes as another fundamental condition,. Moreover, both
Przeworski and Huntington accept that a single democratic state produces a
"snowball" effect, stimulating neighboring populations to insist on democratic rule
after observing the freedom enjoyed next door.294 In Eastern Europe, the catalyst
was Solidarity in Poland. Democracy was set in motion by the union's resistance to
martial law in 1981, and it was emboldened by2 its unexpected victory in the upper
11
parliamentary elections in the summer of 1989.
2. Democracy at the United Nations
The UN had virtually no role in the two democratic waves occurring after
World War II. Indeed, it is not too much to say that these waves occurred in spite
of the drift of the UN's global institutions. Only in the last few years have those
institutions replaced their former hostility toward democracy, sometimes with
revisionist democratic rhetoric. The increasing influence of democracy in the third
wave was achieved often in the face of UN intransigence, rather than through its
encouragement and influence. It was not until December, 1988, that the UN
General Assembly declared that the authority to govern is based on the will of the
people, expressed in periodic and genuine free elections. 296 Armed with this
resolution, one might have expected the UN Secretariat to serve as a stronger
advocate of democracy over the last fifteen years.
Even after democracy entered the common lexicon, the UN has been more
sanguine than realistic about exactly what the term means. Rather than focusing on
democracy, and the representation of aggregate choices through state
representatives, the UN has set into the habit of promoting "participation" through
nongovernmental "interests."' 297 Consequently, the biggest winners have been
NGOs, which have proliferated and become increasingly influential in shaping
global policy. 298 After Rio, NGOs expanded their influence even further while
299
helping to craft global treaties such as the Ottawa3 Convention and the Rome
00
Court.
Criminal
Treaty establishing the International
Speaking before the inaugural conference of the Council for a Community of
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Democracies, UN Secretary-General Annan said he was particularly gratified that
the new coalition of democracies was meeting to support tl;e founding values of
the United Nations, as "set out in the [UN] Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights." 30 1 But from its founding, the UN has had a rather mixed history
with democracy, fluctuating from mild support to active hostility, through stages of
ambivalence, and then only recently graduating to vague expressions of support
that are often devoid of content and rigor.
Contrary to the Secretary-General's platitudes, the word "democracy" does
not appear in the UN Charter, although it is surely embodied in its normative
03
force. 302 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
never mentions the word. Nor does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
although the latter document is particularly important in making numerous
references to human freedom-freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom
of assembly and the right to life, liberty and security of the person. 304 The Articles
of Agreement for each of the five organizations comprising the World Bank have
no mention of democracy.30 5 The charter of the IMF also does not mention
democracy. 30 6 Still, the UN Charter, the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights provide a powerful normative foundation for a leading UN role in
promoting democracy. Only very recently has the UN Secretariat begun to fulfill
that legacy.
By the end of the Cold War, glimmers of democracy began to surface in
orthodox development theory. The overview of the UN Development Program's
(UNDP) Human Development Report 1991: Financing Human Development,
stated: "the basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of
people's choices to make development more democratic and participatory." 30 7 The
document contained no other reference to democracy, which is a somewhat

301.
UN Democracy Caucus: The UNA-USA National Convention, 2003, available at
http://www.ccd2I .org/news/una-usa_convention.htm (last visited on Nov. 6, 2004).
302. Charter of the United Nations, June, 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 93.
303. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
304. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 72-76, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
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organizations: the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International
Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC) Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).
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startling omission, coming in the aftermath of Copenhagen. Instead, the report
provided grudging acknowledgement that there are new ways of thinking about
development, while taking a noncommittal position on which, if any, were
preferable.
The 1991 report suggested that two schools of thought now exist-the "selfinterest or public choice school of political economy" that argues that all
players-citizens, politicians and bureaucrats-seek to influence public policy to
their own ends, and the "platonic" theory of government, that maintains
government is an active, essential and benevolent guardian of the public welfare,
acting in a disinterested manner. 30 8 The UN's conclusion accommodated both
' 3°9
Unable to make a
theories, saying there is "evidence on either side.
determination on which course developing states should follow, the UNDP sidestepped the issue, and offered this: "Political and economic transition is an art,
a science. A successful strategy requires pragmatism, not ideological
rather than
310
stance."
At the fifty-first session of the UN General Assembly in 1997, the world body
31
adopted what should have been a landmark, the Agenda for Development. This
resolution recognized that democracy, development and human rights are all
mutually reinforcing. The resolution also named democracy and fundamental
freedoms, as well as human rights and a right to transparent government, each as
essential to the realization of social and people-centered sustainable
development. 31 2 The central importance of democracy in development, however,
was ignored. Much like an outsider peering in, the UN acknowledged, "democracy
everywhere," without, however, attaching itself to the right side of
is spreading
3
31

history.

The primary reason for the lackadaisical approach toward democracy remains
the power and influence of the development orthodoxy. Part of the problem also
lies, ironically enough, with the growth of American power in the late-1990s.
Because the United States is the most powerful nation, as well as the most forceful
proponent of democracy in the world, anti-Americanism has a tendency to generate
314
For example, public
and reflect opposition to democracy more generally.
2003, found that,
June,
in
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Balkan
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markets
to
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with
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314. "[A]nti-Americanism is not a passing sentiment ... it cannot be explained simply in terms of
the unpopularity of the Bush administration or widespread hostility to the American-led war in Iraq.
There is growing consensus that anti-Americanism" is a 'master framework' with broad and flexible
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were the most pro-democratic tended also to be the most pro-American. 3 16 In many
countries, the rise of anti-Americanism is a major obstacle to democratization,
serving as7 a surrogate political movement for anti-market and anti-democratic
31
politics.
Anti-globalism is the final major contributor to agnosticism toward
democracy. The anti-globalists assert that democracy "limits choices" by
compelling governments to make decisions within constraints that are politically
feasible, whereas authoritarian states have the "benefit" of making choices without
regard for public preferences.318
3. Regimes Matter- Przeworski
The ambivalence and hostility toward democracy raises the question whether
regime type really matters. Recent statistical modeling by a team led by Adam
Przeworski at the University of Chicago has resolved the question-it does. In one
of the most comprehensive analyses on democracy and development, Przeworski
31 9
isolated statistical evidence of the impact of dictatorship and democracy.
Working inductively, Przeworski compared 111 variables against political regime
types for 135 countries for each year from 1950-1990.320 Although Przeworski
tends to give credence to the theory that minimum per capita income is essential
for democracy to take root, ultimately he rejects the dictator-to-development
model. 321 Przeworski's research lies in a no-man's land beyond modernization
theory but not entirely committed to democracy promotion.
In an update of Lipset and Huntington, Przeworski argued that it is
demonstrable that democracies are more likely to be found in more highly
developed countries, but this is because democratic regimes never fall once per
capita incomes reach about $6,000.322 Per capita incomes rise in both democratic
and autocratic regimes, but once income reaches the $6,000 threshold, democratic
governance persists and democracy survives. 323 In 2003, Przeworski concluded,
"No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income higher than that of
Argentina in 1975, $6,055. "324 Above $6,055, "democracy lasts forever. 325
Przeworski went beyond modernization theory to challenge its central feature
316. Id.
317. Id. at 14-16.
318. Adam Przeworski & Covadonga Meseguer Yerba, Globalization and Democracy, Paper
prepared for the Conference on Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution, Santa Fe Institute, May
16-19, 2002, at 2. ("Direct external influences on national policies-whether in the form of a general
opinion climate or explicit conditionality-seem to be highly policy-specific.") Id. at 15.
319. The team was comprised of Adam Przeworski, now at New York University, Michael E.
Alvarez, Depaul University, Josd Antonio Cheibub, Yale University and Fernando Limongi, University
of S~o Paulo.
320. Przeworski & Yerba, supra note 285, at 12.
321. See generally id.
322. Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 131, at 128-32.

323. Id. at 137.
324. Adam Przeworski, Why Do PoliticalPartiesObey Results of Elections?, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE RULE OF LAW 115 (Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003).
325. Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 131, at 106.

2006

GLOBAL AND GOING NOWHERE

that democratic regimes are no better or worse than authoritarian regimes. Writing
in Democracy and Development, Przeworski argued that political regimes were not
dispositive of economic growth, but then concluded that because dictatorships
"depend on the will, and sometimes the whim, of a dictator, they exhibit a high
variance of economic performance.... ,,326 In the end, per capita incomes grow
' 327
Przeworski's research is
slower and people's lives are shorter in dictatorships."
growth as well as
economic
affect
regimes
valuable in showing that political
and not an
policy
government
of
process
is
a
political liberty. Development
outcome of simple conditions.
The emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic
development. Democracy is... established by political actors
pursuing their goals, and it can be initiated at any level of
development. Only once it is established do economic constraints
play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater
when the country is richer.... If they succeed in generating
development, democracies can survive even in the poorest
nations.
Przeworski also showed that political stability is not transportable across
regime types. The very phenomena that constitute instability in
dictatorships-changes in rulers, strikes, demonstrations-are just part of everyday
life in a democracy." 329 In a dictatorship, any actual or anticipated change of
leadership or political opposition carries such uncertainty that it imposes special
social and economic costs on society, arresting development. Even though such
330
By
phenomena are much more common in a democracy, they are routine.
permitting continual change at slow moving gradations and within accepted
political and legal parameters, democracies make change less unsettling.
4. Democracy Causes Development-Roll & Talbott
Many in the contemporary period are uncertain whether Lipset-Huntington
were correct or whether Rustow was on to something. For example, the UN's
Human Development Report of 1992: Global Dimension of Human Development
dedicated an entire chapter to political freedom. 331 The report celebrated political
freedom as an essential element of human development, but argued that the link
between democracy and development could not be isolated. "The link between
freedom and development is seldom in dispute. What is often disputed the
leads to more
causality-the direction of the arrow, whether more freedom
332
freedom."
more
to
leads
development
more
or
development
Although Przeworski determined that regimes matter, his research is
sometimes equivocal on whether democracy produces economic growth. Richard
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Roll and John R. Talbott, two scholars at the University of California-Los Angeles,
provided a clearer picture of what is going on as a country transitions to
democracy, and they buried modernization theory.
Does political and democratic reform produce economic conditions that lead
to more rapid economic development? Or conversely, do exogenous improvements
in income and economic development precipitate citizen action to push for
democracy? Roll and Talbott employed an events-study method to reach some
quite dramatic findings on these questions. 3 33 The events-study method is a
statistical technique that financial economists have used for decades to isolate the
impact of a particular event, such as a stock split, in the life of a business
334
corporation.
Roll and Talbott examined the impact of events that represent a material
change in a country's level of political freedom to determine how a country's
political shift affects economic growth. There were two distinct event categories
which were derived from the 2001 CIA World Factbook. The first category
included "democratic" events that may be seen as proxies for increasing political
freedom, such as a country's first ever free elections, the removal of a dictator or
the addition to the ballot of a party other than the ruling party. 335 The second event
category included anti-democratic events, such as the establishment of military or
one-party rule, or suspension of the constitution.336
Roll and Talbott's findings indicated a rather vivid difference in GNIpc
following democratic versus anti-democratic events. The average sample country
experiencing a democratic event had essentially flat economic growth-0.67 % per
year-in the five years preceding the event. 337 After a democratic event, the
economies of these same average countries grew quite rapidly, accelerating to
338
2.2% per year in the first five years after the event.
The growth rate for post-democratic event states fell to an annual rate of 1.7%
in the second five-year period after the event, before increasing to 2.7% in the
subsequent decade. 339 The average sample country experiencing an anti-democratic
event had a 1.6% average economic growth rate in the decade before the event, and
a rate of only .85% for the decade after the event. 34 It is not too much for the
authors to claim that their research "constitute[s] compelling evidence that
democracy-related changes by a country's government cause changes in per capita
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income."

34 1

When countries undertake a democratic change, such as deposing a dictator,
they enjoy a rather dramatic spurt in economic growth. The growth spurt persists
for at least two decades. In contrast, an anti-democratic event is followed by a
of cross-country
reduction in economic growth. Democratic conditions are causes
342
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B. The 'Discovery' of Markets and Economic Freedom
Economic freedom works to create wealth, but freedom should be valued as
an end in itself-as an unqualified human right. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 stated that everyone has the right to own property alone or
in association with others, and no person may be arbitrarily deprived of
property. 343 This expressed a normative value independent of the power of
is a form of selfeconomic freedom to raise living standards. Market participationhuman
dignity.344
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Economic human rights, as important as they are for economic growth and
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countries. Unfortunately, the UN was not at the forefront of change. The UNDP
summed up accurately the mood of old thinking that permeated development
thought in 1990, when it declared flatly, "[t]here is no automatic link between
349
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economic growth and human progress." In that same UNDP report,
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The fall of the Soviet Union brought forth great introspection and triggered a
reassessment in world development, particularly among the developed countries
that dispense development aid. The implosion at the Kremlin resolved the debate
about whether there was something fatally wrong with a centrally-planned system.
Many were disappointed, thinking that beyond the absurdities of the Kafkaesque
communist state they could glimpse a genuine alternative to Western
approaches.351 When Soviet socialism failed economically, some scholars held on
tightly, producing even more complementary theories that explained development
in terms of exogenous factors, such as the availability of natural resources, levels
of educational achievement, physical proximity to world markets and, interestingly
enough, levels of economic development. Each of these explanation would prove
spurious.
1. The Washington Consensus
The international development organizations located in Washington, D.C.
were the first global players officially to adopt the centrality of markets in
economic growth. The World Bank and the IMF reached a consensus on advice
offered to the Latin American states in 1989.352 John Williamson coined the term
"Washington Consensus" to describe this set of market oriented reforms that the
state-directed economies of Latin America should adopt to spur economic
growth.353

Although the Consensus formula was geographically and historically specific,
it gained acceptance as a distillation of the policies emanating from the Thatcher
and Reagan administrations, and reached the intellectual mainstream.354 Later, the
Washington Consensus would be applied to development choices in Asia and
Africa.355 The checklist of principles includes fiscal discipline, tax reform that
lowered marginal rates and broadened the tax base, trade and investment
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, secure property rights and redirection of
public spending towards areas that offer higher investment return, such as
356
healthcare and education.
The Washington Consensus provided an alternative to resource-based and
other exogenous models of development, and it filled the vacuum left by central
planning, which was discredited. 7 The Consensus soon became a shorthand
reference for globalization and neo-liberalism, transforming into a broader and less
doctrinaire theory of development. In 1992, even the UNDP would get on board,
proclaiming, "Markets are the means, human development is the end., 358 During
351. Rist, supra note 97, at 178.
352. John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? 15
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, 251 (2000).
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the next year, 1993, the UNDP expanded its discussion to include the need for
and359that
markets to be able to work freely in a stable macroeconomic environment,
offers rewards for enterprise.
the economy should contain a fair tax system and
Detractors would argue that individual policy components of the Washington
Consensus were not independently correlated with development. But econometric
economic
analysis at the IMF showed that the policies were effective in promoting
360
development when used as a package of mutually reinforcing policies. The core
policies of the Washington Consensus could be expected to greatly increase the
chance of a country experiencing rapid economic growth when put in place as a
comprehensive plan. The results were far less certain if a country adopted only a
in a cafeteria style, or
single component, selected only some of the components
36 1
adopted components on a rolling basis one by one. This suggested that those
hoping to cherry-pick a few components of economic liberalization and graft those
to an authoritarian system would be disappointed.
By the late 1990s, it had become tragically clear that four decades and billions
had been
of dollars in development aid by donor nations to the developing states
362
Without
policies.
largely wasted on nations lacking sound macroeconomic
in
difference
dramatic
a
make
economic reform, the ability of increased aid to
developing
the
energy
and
time
developing countries was doubtful. For all the
world expended wringing aid concessions from the developed countries, the means
to generate far greater wealth through adoption of market-oriented strategies was
already before them.
all
For example, in 2003, total official global development assistance from
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comparison, total foreign investment
Development (OECD) countries into developing countries was $192 billion,
states were $93 billion and
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trillion-more than 1/3 rd of their
Developing countries could grow their aggregate income by $532 billion by
2015 if world trade barriers could be reduced. In a World Bank study of fifty-six
developing countries from 1970-1993, there was a strong correlation between

359.
360.

PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION, supra note 311, at 4.
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Jahangir Aziz & Robert F. Wescott, Policy Complementaries and the Washington

18-19 (Working Paper of the Int'l Monetary Fund, WP/97/118, 1997).
361. Id.

Environment, FIN. &
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DEV., Dec. 1997, at 5-6.
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364. ld. (Worker remittances from the United States alone account for $28 billion, almost twice
amount of official development assistance).
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development assistance and economic growth, but only for those countries that
implemented open trade regimes and free markets and exercised fiscal
discipline. 366 The findings were particularly strong for the forty-one low-income
countries in the sample, which included Bolivia, El Salvador, Mali, Honduras and
Ghana. 367 Using market economics and fiscal responsibility, even the poorest
countries were able to leverage scarce aid dollars and generate growth.
2. Economic Freedom of the World-The Fraser Institute
Forty years ago, Milton Friedman's principles of free markets, individual
freedom and dispersed governmental power could not be tested empirically
because there was insufficient data. Since then, however, data has accumulated to
support his thesis. One of the most comprehensive and detailed studies on
economic freedom in the world is conducted each year by the Fraser Institute in
Vancouver, Canada. The Fraser data show that as levels of economic freedom
increase, so too does economic performance. 368 Unapologetically, the Fraser
economists aver, "[tihe key to changing policy in the world is changing the climate
of opinion about what works and what does not work in encouraging world
development. 369
The work of the Fraser Institute is collated into an index called Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW). EFW gauges the degree of economic freedom in
five areas: (1) size of government (government spending, taxes and government
enterprise); (2) stable legal structures and protection of property rights; (3) access
to sound money; (4) free international trade; and, (5) regulation of business, labor
and credit. 370 Each area is comprised of twenty-one components, and a number of
these components are themselves made up of several subcomponents. 37'
In total, the index is constructed from thirty-eight subcomponents
comprised of economic data, such as the growth of the money supply. Qualitative
measures, such as the degree of independence of the judiciary and the integrity of
the legal system, are included. 372 Rather than focusing solely on what might be
termed "corporate-friendly" practices, EFW is especially concerned with
understanding how individuals fare at the microeconomic level in society.373 In
order for individuals, as opposed to corporate entities, to prosper, the system must
366. Burnside & Dollar, supra note 329, at 1-3.
367. Id.at 2-3.
368. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 2004 ANNUAL

REPORT (2004). The report is co-published with nearly sixty policy and economic institutions from
virtually every area of the world.
369. Brief, Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2004, Fraser Institute, Jul. 15, 2004
(Copy on file with the author).

370. Gwartney and Lawson, supra note 337, at 28.
371. Id.at 6.
372. For example, Area 2, Sound Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, assembles
survey data from the International Country Risk Guide, compiled by a Fraser Institute panel of experts,
and the Global Competitiveness Report, created by business leaders. Together, these surveys are a
proxy for measuring a nation's legal structure and the security of property rights-whether the law
enforcement system protects the property rights of owners and enforces contracts in an even-handed
manner. Id. at 6-7.
373. Id. at 3.

2006

GLOBAL AND GOING NOWHERE

protect and promote individual economic rights as individual civil liberties.
Economic human rights include variables such as the extent of personal choice in
society, the ability of individuals to conduct voluntary exchanges, the freedom to
openly compete and enter markets, and the security of privately owned personal
property.374 The Fraser Institute has compiled an impressive report that chronicles
the correlation between freedom and development throughout the world.
3. Economic Freedom Causes Development-Roll & Talbott
Many people accept the correlation between wealth and freedom, but
finding what causes this correlation has not been easy. Analogous to the question
of political development is a parallel question of economic development. Do
market reforms bring about economic growth, or are there exogenous
improvements in the economy, such as higher incomes, that then generate
development? 375 In other words, does economic liberty make people prosper, or do
prosperous people seek out and then create a system of economic freedom?
As part of their work on the relationship between democratic and
authoritarian political events and GNIpc, Roll and Talbott also searched for
measure
causative economic variables by comparing GNIpc as a broad and376stable
.
the
Among
determinants
societal
fourteen
against
wellbeing
of economic
fourteen variables tested, property rights (positive), informal market activity (e.g.
black markets) (negative) and regulation377(negative) had the highest levels of
GNIpc.
statistical significance in relation to
The researchers' regression analysis indicated the critical ingredient of
successful development was an economic and political system that invites
profitable economic exchanges among individual market participants, without risk
378
of expropriation or repudiation. The variables had high levels of statistical
significance and directional impact.
The next three most significant variables correlating to economic
prosperity were political rights (positive) and civil liberties and freedom of the
press (positive), providing additional support for the proposition that economic and
political freedoms operate in tandem to make countries wealthy. A complementary
study from the World Bank found that there is a strong and consistent link between
the measure of civil liberties in a society and the extent of successful economic
379
performance derived from World Bank-sponsored projects.

The weak property rights regimes in many Third World countries
discourages investment, diverts energy into black markets and smuggling, and
380
The powerful synergy between the rule
renders external assistance ineffective.

374. Id.
375. Roll and Talbott, supra note 300, at 81.
376. Id. at 76.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 76-77.
379. Lant Pritchett, Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects,
1998 FIN. & DEV. 26, 27. This article draws from on the study, Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and
WORLD
Lant Pritchett, Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects, 11
BANK ECON. REV. 219, 219-42 (1997).
380. Roll and Talbott, supranote 300, at 78.
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of law, democracy and economic freedom is illustrated by Peruvian economist and
brilliant maverick Hernando de Soto:
The poor inhabitants of [developing] nations-five-sixths of
humanity-do have things, but they lack the process to represent their
property and create capital. They have houses but not titles; crops but
not deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation. It is the
unavailability of these essential representations that explains why people
who have adopted every other Western invention, from the paper clip to
the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to
make domestic capitalism work.38'
C. Environmental Sustainability& Democracy
The only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is
through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights.
-H.J.

McCloskey

382

Postmodern theorists suggest that sustainable development requires the
creation of a new democratic rationality, in which the preferences of "virtual
groupings," such as future generations, the distant poor, or other species, must be
identified and represented.383 Arriving at this new rationality operationally is nondemocratic. Post-modernists seek to develop mechanisms that can surmount the
public's tendency to assert citizen competence and to overcome the public's
misguided common sense in complex ecological issues. 384 In some cases,
democracy actually undermines sustainable development. "Pluralism's greatest
strength can become the ecosystem's greatest weakness...385
These theorists worry that the "ecological clock is ticking," and advocate

a rebalancing away from representative democracy toward "ecological

democracy. '386 Efforts at rebalancing power in a shift away from democracy are
strengthened by voices of authoritarian regimes. The composition of the major
environmental conferences, as well as the UN Environmental Program, is rife with
autocratic member governments. 387 The views of autocracies magnify those of
extreme environmentalists who approach their calling as something akin to a
religion. 388
381.

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST

6-7 (2000).
382. H. J. MCCLOSKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS 159 (1983).
383. William M. Lafferty, Democratic Parametersfor Regional Sustainable Development: The
Need for a New Demos with a New Rationality 18-19 (University of Oslo, Program for Research and
Documentation for a Sustainable Society, Working Paper No. 1/00, 2000).
384. Id. at 22-23.
385. Id. at 23.
386. Id. at 25-28, 30.
387. Nils Petter Gleditsch and Bjorn Otto Sverdrup, DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Paper
presented to the 36th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, Feb. 2125, 1995 at 21.
388. Michael Crichton, Environmentalism as Religion, Remarks to the Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco, California, Sep. 15, 2003 http://www.crichton-official.com/speeches/speechesquote05.html
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE
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1. Autocracy and Environmental Catastrophe
As a rule, autocratic regimes treat the environment with the same
389
Autocratic
purposeful recklessness and brutality that they treat their people.
also make
governance
democratic
toward
states
states that make the transition
to keen
evident
was
fact
This
conservation.
environmental
progress toward
H.J.
ethicist
and
philosopher
the
when
ago,
years
twenty
than
more
observers
McCloskey argued it was the democracies that were implementing measures to
of Africa and the Arab
protect ecology, and it was China and the dictatorships
390
offenders.
environmental
worst
world, that were the
Even more moderate autocratic states show little ecological awareness or
sensitivity. The milder flavor of South American dictators in Chile and Argentina
in the early 1980s, for example, came to power under the guise of safeguarding
39 1
It quickly became apparent,
human values and the protecting the environment.
however, that the regimes constituted greater threats to both than did the
392
Unfortunately, the dictatorships traded on
governments they replaced.
legitimacy endowed upon them at the time from Malthusian luminaries like
393
and economist Robert L.
Stanford University biologist Paul R. Ehrlich
394
to market democracies was
inherent
freedom
that
Both men argued
Heilbroner.
disaster.
promoting ecological

(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). See also, Gleditsch and Sverdrup, supra note 357, at 21 (environmentalism
in its quasi-religious form threatens democracy as much as other forms of fanaticism), and referencing
Harald Liebich, Naturvern som religion [Environmentalism as Religion], HUMANIST no. 3, 22-25.
389. Alexander H. Joffe, The Environmental Legacy of Saddam Husayn: The Archeology of
Totalitarianismin Modern Iraq, 33 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 313 (2000).
390. McCloskey, supra note 349, at 157.
391. Id. at 158.
392. Id.
393. Dr. Ehrlich's work helped ignite and propel the environmental movement. He is well-known
for his notoriously inaccurate prediction of a world population explosion, THE POPULATION BOMB
(1968). His most recent work, ONE WITH NINEVAH: POLITICS, CONSUMPTION AND THE HUMAN FUTURE

(2004), is a dire warning of looming environmental catastrophe that threatens to make the world into a
new fallen Ninevah. (In the Old Testament, the prophet Jonah prophesies the destruction of Ninevah,
the capital of the Assyrian Empire). Ehrlich is perhaps best known for the 1980 bet he made with Dr.
Julian Simon, an economist at the University of Maryland. Simon maintained that human ingenuity
would solve problems associated with population growth. He contended that if Ehrlich were correct that
the world would experience greater scarcity, then the price of natural resources would tend to increase
over time. Instead, Simon predicted that commodity prices would fall, and he challenged Ehrlich to a
wager. He let Ehrlich pick any commodity and any future date to illustrate his point that commodities
would fall over time. Ehrlich accepted, and in October 1980, he purchased $1,000.00 worth of metals,
evenly divided among tungsten, copper, tin, nickel and chrome. If the total value of the metals was
higher in 1990, Simon would have to pay him the difference. If the metals fell in price, Ehrlich would
have to pay Simon the difference. In 1990, Ehrlich sent Simon a check for $576; all five metals had
declined in value. John Tierney, The Big City; Optimism by the Numbers, N. Y. TIMES, Jan.3, 1999,
Section 6, at 10.
394.

See, e.g., HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974). In the spirit of

Heilbroner, a recent scholar has argued that global civilization is on the verge of collapse and can only
be saved by a massive decrease in the human population and resource use. See Geoffrey P. Glasby,
Sustainable Development: The Need for a New Paradigm,4 ENV'T, DEV. AND SUSTAINABILITY 333,
339-42 (2002).
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Unlike the extensive studies that have established powerful correlations
between democracy and economic development, there is a paucity of empirical
analysis on democracies and ecology. Although there is a great need for such
research, one area of difficulty has been in reducing assessed environmental
conditions into measurable metrics, particularly outside North America and
Western Europe. 95 Because of the lack of extensive empirical data, one of the best
ways to approach a study of the impact of regime type on the environment is the
case study.
One case immediately leaps to mind-the environmental calamity of the
former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. The well-known economic failures of
the USSR have a parallel story in the astounding environmental devastation
wrought by the Soviet regime. 396 Moscow's abject disregard for the natural
environment is astonishing, revealed only after the opening of the country in 1989.
In 1992, Murray Freshbach, at the time a research professor of demography at
Georgetown University, teamed up with Alfred Friendly, Jr., the Moscow
correspondent for Newsweek, to analyze the impact of decades of environmental
abuse. Their panoramic study coined the term "ecocide:"
When historians finally conduct an autopsy of the Soviet Union and
Soviet Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide....
No other great industrial civilization so systematically and so long
poisoned its land, air, water and people. None so loudly proclaiming its
efforts to improve public health and protect nature so degraded both.
And no advanced society faced such a bleak political and economic
reckoning with so few resources to invest toward recovery.397
The Soviet Union was mired in shocking environmental catastrophe at every level
of society. The effects of the Chernobyl debacle and the Aral Sea tragedy are still
unfolding, and serve as powerful iconography for the cornucopia of pollution,
disease and environmental degradation that is a hallmark of autocratic regimes.
One of the critical factors energizing these ruinous policies is a lack of
transparency-autocratic governments are notoriously poor in monitoring
environmental pollution, collecting information about polluters, tabulating the data
and releasing it to the public. 398 Decade after decade, problems persist, exacerbated
by government inattention. Moreover, government data that is not subject to
probing challenge to its veracity and dissent from independent groups is onedimensional, and therefore of limited utility.
The Soviet experience was repeated throughout communist
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. In those countries,
environmental decision-making was considered a secretive process, without public
participation or critique by outside experts. 399 Important environmental decisions
395. ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDEX supra note 188, at 24; Rodger A. Payne, Freedom

and the Environment, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 41, 42 (1995).
396. See generally P. CRAIG ROBERTS & KAREN LAFOLLETTE, MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY (1990).
397. Murray Feshbach & Alfred Friendly, Jr., Facing Facts, in ECOCIDE OF THE USSR: HEALTH
AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE 1 (1992).

398. Cynthia B. Schultz & Tamara Raye Crockett, Economic Development, Democratizationand
EnvironmentalProtection in Eastern Europe, 18 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 62 (1990).

399. Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-Communist Central
Europe: From High Hopes to HardReality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 921, 962 (1992).
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4°°
were made, much like judicial decisions, through "telephone law." Communist
party officials would telephone their counterparts in state agencies or in40judicial
1
proceedings to inform them of the expected outcome to a particular dispute.
Environmental protection under communism was considered the
privileged domain of the state. The secrecy rendered outside voices bare "trace
elements" in comparison with official policy. 40 2 Consequently, governments
operated within an incomplete model of decision-making in which a preference
was placed on political and economic decisions at the expense of environmental
considerations.403

2. Democratic Action and Environmental Protection
After more than forty years of decision-making behind closed doors,
dismantling the Eastern European system posed immense challenge. Yet the
emerging democracies have done remarkably well, a credit to the flexibility and
resilience of the new regimes in coming to terms with the poisoned environmental
legacy of communism. 4°4 By the late 1990s, the constitutions of Bulgaria, the
among the most
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia40were
5
protection.
environmental
for
world
the
in
charters
advanced
While the problem of managing contemporary environmental problems
exists in all states, many developing countries face a special challenge of cascading
environmental degradation. 40 6 For these nations particularly, liberal democracy and
freedom will be essential to protecting the ecosystem. Like the development
economists, however, many environmentalists have fallen into the "world systems"
trap, suggesting that a decline in the global environment is attributable to an
imbalance in the North-South dynamic.40 7 The theory is the environmental
corollary to dependency theory in economics. Environmental stress tends to flow
from the point of most environmental resistance to the least. 4°8 The most resistance
is in the North, composed of democratic countries with strong environmental
9
regulations, active environmental groups and more responsive governments. 40 The
400.

Kathryn Hendley, Demandfor Law; Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The

Neglected Issue of the Demand for Law, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 2 (1999),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num4/feature/rewriting.html.
401. Bowman & Hunter, supra note 366, at 962.
402. Id. at 962 n.196 (citing Jan Drgonec, State of Environmental Law in Czecho-Slovakia (Mar.
1999)(unpublished manuscript)).
at 962.
403. Id.
404. For example, in the Czech Republic, the government balanced critical environmental needs
requiring immediate remedies with a responsible comprehensive and long-term approach in the area of
air pollution. David Lu, Note, Air Pollution Regulation in the Czech Republic: Environmental
Protectionin the Context of Politicaland Economic Transition, 13 WIS. INT'L L. J. 565, 583-84 (1995).
405. Mark N. Salvo, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw and Sustainable Development in Central
Europe: Are We There Yet?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 141, 150 (1997).

406. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, supra note 191, at 34-35.
407. Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in PostcolonialSocieties: Straddling the Local
Global Institution Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-3 (2000); Gaetan Verhoosel,
Beyond the UnsustainableRhetoric of Sustainable Development: TransferringEnvironmentally Sound
Technologies, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 49 (1998).

408. See Richardson, supra note 374, at 2-3.
409. Gregory F. Maggio, Inter/intra-generationalEquity: Current Applications Under
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points of least resistance are in the South, where many countries are governed by
insular regimes that do not reflect the will of the people. 410 Poor nations become
havens of environmental waste and hazardous substances, and additionally suffer
from the North's appetite for natural resources. 411 Typically, the purported solution
is to turn toward responses at the global level. A more effective approach,
however, is found at the state level. Unrepresentative regimes barter their state's
ecology for private gain.412 One those regimes lose power to democracy, the trend
can begin to reverse.
One contemporary criticism of democracies and the environment is that
their strong national stake in economic growth, generally propelled by business
interests, runs counter to environmental protection. 413 On the contrary, open
societies are far more likely to produce effective political counterweights to
polluting commercial enterprise. Field research by the World Wildlife Fund in
Africa shows a strong correlation between decentralized political control and
environmental conservation.4 14 This is because the transparency and the
widespread distribution of information in a free society encourage better
environmental practices and speed technological advance. Even in the absence of
technological breakthrough, distributed information empowers locals to more
effectively address environmental issues. Democratic regimes tend to distribute
information about the environment, around which popular expressions of concern
can collect. In a free society, people may gather unhindered to form interest groups
and to lobby for stricter regulations. Principles of open debate permit
environmentalists to distribute educational materials and promote new ideas. The
flow of information in a democracy also informs a free media, making it more
likely that the government will be challenged on environmental issues. Of course,
InternationalLaw for Promoting the SustainableDevelopment of Natural Resources, 4 BUFF. ENVTL.

L.J. 161, 177 (1997) (quoting David A. Sarokin and Jason Schulkin, Environmental Justice:
Coevolution of Environmental Concerns and Social Justice, 14 THE EVIRONMENTALIST 121,

128

(1994)).
410. See Bowman & Hunter, supranote 366, at 962-63.
411. Marguerite M. Cusack, InternationalLaw and the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous
Waste to the Third World: Will the Basel Convention Make a Difference?, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &

POL'Y 393 (1990) (noting that three million tons of hazardous waste were shipped to Third World
nations between 1986 and 1988).
412. Speaking at Georgetown University in December, 1991, then presidential candidate Bill
Clinton launched what he called a "new covenant" for national security that would serve as the
centerpiece of his foreign policy. Clinton supported President George H. W. Bush on an array of foreign
policy decisions, calling his formation and leadership of an international coalition to eject Saddam
Hussein's army from Kuwait a "masterful job." Taking exception to other policies, however, Clinton
called for a sweeping rearrangement of U.S. foreign policy toward "engagement and enlargement" that
would be grounded in the promotion of freedom and democracy around the world. Citing the
advantages and benefits of democracies over their non-democratic peers, Clinton argued, among other
things, democracies are more likely to protect the global environment. Governor William J. Clinton, A
New Covenant for American Security, Remarks to Students at Georgetown University (Dec. 12, 1991),
availableat http://www.ndol.org/ndolci.cfm?kaid= 128&subid=174&contentid=250537.
413. JOHN S. DRYZEK, RATIONAL ECOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 120-31 (1987).
414. Jesse Ribot, The Experiences of the World Resources Institute in Africa: An Initiativefor
Environmental Accountability in Africa-Decentralization,i n GREENING DEMOCRACY AND
G OVERNING
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(2000),

available

at

http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/publications/asia/greening/greening.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2004).
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industrial interests also have these rights, but the historical record of widely
publicized environmental crises-from Love Canal to Three-Mile
Island-suggests that democratic governments are responsive to environmental
concerns. 41 Environmental causes do not gather power only through impending
crisis, either. When Rachel Carson released her classic, Silent Spring, she triggered
a nationwide debate on the use of pesticides.4 6
Since the human rights records of democracies generally are better than

autocracies, environmentalists are much less likely to be muzzled, harassed,
417
In
beaten, detained, imprisoned, raped, tortured or murdered for their work.
order for an individual to be an effective advocate for the environment, protection
of their civil and political rights is paramount.4 18
Human rights abuses are not restricted absolutely to non-democratic
states, but their prevalence and severity are far greater in non-democratic countries.
For example, in September, 1999, in the Narmada Valley of India, peaceful
demonstrators protesting the construction of the Narmada Dam were intimidated,
held for thirteen days, but then
beaten and arrested by police.4 19 They
420
-. were
released by order of an independent judge. In contrast, abuse by the Burmese
Army paints a far more dangerous scenario. In Burma, there is no independent
judiciary to monitor the repugnant conduct of the army in its collaboration with
industry to construct the Yadana pipeline. 421 Evidence indicates the Burmese Army
has forced relocations, impressed citizens into slave labor to work on the project
and carried out extra-judicial killings of local activists in association with the
pipeline.422
Even in former communist countries like Bulgaria that had decent
42
Effective
environmental laws, those laws were not enforced effectively.
state-the
coherent
and
a
powerful
than
more
environmental enforcement requires
state must have the authority to establish and enforce a culture of legal
compliance. 424 There must be political legitimacy. Under communist rule, Bulgaria
placed undue emphasis on a production-driven public industry. The country had a
415. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements and Law Reform: Social Movements, Law, and Society:
The Institutionalizationof the EnvironmentalMovement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 110-12 (2001).
416. Payne, supra note 362, at 44.
417. Id. at 43. "Today, in too many countries, it is dangerous business to be an environmentalist."
INT'L & SIERRA CLUB, DEFENDING THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE:
ENVIRONMENTALISTS UNDER FIRE--10 URGENT CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE at 3 (2d ed. 2000),
AMNESTY

available at http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/amnesty/report.pdf

[hereinafter DEFENDING

THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE].

418. See, Michael J. Kane, PromotingPoliticalRights to Protect the Environment, 18 YALE. J.
INT'L L. 389, 411 (1993).
419.

DEFENDING THOSE WHO GIVE THE EARTH A VOICE, supra note 384, at 14.

420. Id.
421. See id. at 5 (noting that the Burma victims needed to resort to the U.S. federal courts for
recourse).

422. Id. at 4-5.
423. James Friedberg & Branimir Zaimov, Politics, Environment and the Rule of Law in Bulgaria,
4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 225, 263 (1994).
424. Abram Chayes & Antonio Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 193 (1993),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION READER, at 265-66
(Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons eds., MIT Press 2001).
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corrupt and unresponsive bureaucracy, a lack of respect for neutral legal norms
embodied in the rule of law, and the state was governed by ruling communist elites
with immense and unchecked discretionary power. 425 It is somewhat counterintuitive that autocratic states are less effective at enforcing their own laws, but
their governments tend to be neither responsive nor accountable. In the Czech
Republic, the transition from a communist government to a democratic
government and free market economy yielded a dramatic improvement in the state
of the natural environment. One critical factor was the increased emphasis of the
new government on environmental enforcement. 426 Markets and the rule of law
generate useful legal and quasi-legal principles that promote environmental
regulation, such as "polluter pays," and create mechanisms
such as direct
427
bargaining that shift the cost of externalities onto the polluter.
One of the few empirical studies to approach the question of whether
democracy is correlated with environmental protection was conducted by Nils
Petter Gleditsch and Bjorn Otto Sverdrup of the International Peace Research
Institute in Oslo, Norway, and the University of Trondheim. Their seminal work
considered how states performed on some of the most important environmental
indicators.428 They then compared environmental performance against levels of
democratization and freedom in the state, as derived from the highly-regarded
Polity database. Their results are mixed, but generally supportive of democracy.
Democracies have fewer endangered mammal species than autocracies, but more
endangered bird species. 429 This is probably because mammals such as whales and
panda bears have become important symbols of the environmental debate in
democracies. Developed states tended to emit a higher level of green house gases,
but their economic production is associated with less deforestation, increased
sanitary and public health conditions and a list of other positive environmental
indicators. 430 Moreover, democracies have lower overall CO 2 emissions than nondemocracies, after controlling for the size of the economy and oil production. 431 As
developing
states achieve higher levels of development, emission levels taper
32
4

off.

425. Id. at 259-63.
426. J. Cameron Thurber, Will Retrocession to a Communist Sovereign Have a DetrimentalEffect
on the Emphasis and Enforcement of Laws Protecting Hong Kong's Environment? The Czech
Experience as Contraposition, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 46 (2001). Under Czech democracy,

the communist era preferential treatment for waiving or reducing environmental penalties for foreign or
military entities diminished. Dietrich Earnhart, Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws Under
Communism and Democracy,40 J.L. & ECON. 377, 399-400 (1997).
427. See, e.g., Robert Repetto, Economic Incentives for Sustainable Production, in
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 69, 71, 77-78 (Gunter Schramm &

Jeremy J. Warford eds., 1989).
428. Nils Petter Gleditsch & Bjorn Otto Sverdrup, Democracy and the Environment, in HUMAN
SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45, 56-65 (Edward A. Page & Michael Redclif eds., 2002). These
included per capita emissions of climate gases, emissions of CO 2 per capita, deforestation, threats to
biodiversity, lack of safe drinking water, lack of sanitary services and population growth.
429. Id. at 61.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 62.
432. Id.
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The empirical study also confirms that democracies have much greater
participation in environmental treaties and environmental organizations,
confirming that free societies are more involved with other countries to solve
environmental issues.433 In sum, development, irrespective of regime type, tends to
introduce some environmental problems, while alleviating others. Democracy,
however, tends to mobilize societal counter forces that ameliorate and reduce
democratic polities do a better
environmental pollution. The authors
434 concluded that
job of addressing the environment.
for Development
D. Peace and Security-Prerequisites
So far, we have seen that democracy and free markets better promote
ecologically sustainable development. The final piece of sustainable development
is regional peace and security. Without peace, sustainable development is doomed.
One cannot approach the question of sustainable development seriously without
taking some measure of the impact of threats to human security and war on
sustainable development. The UN General Assembly has declared that "Warfare is
inherently destructive of sustainable development."' 435 Although the General
Assembly has recognized that "[d]evelopment cannot be attained in the absence of
peace and security,''436 it has not integrated this fact into its approach to
development.
Because democracies are accustomed to achieving political goals through
the rule of law rather than fiat, they are better suited to the process of negotiating
437
and then implementing international agreements and institutions. Their openness
and transparency encourages the spread of information and promotes verification,
438
generating confidence among parties to an agreement. Democratic governance is
slow and complicated, and this assures neighbors that change would come slowly
in a democracy, lowering the risk of abrupt change.439
1. Human Security and Development
A prerequisite for sustainable development is a general condition of
human security and regional peace. The sustainable development orthodoxy has
ignored this fact, setting aside one of the most powerful and interesting schools of
thought in international relations-the democratic peace. In 1953, Quincy Wright
made the prescient observation that absolutism has an undeniable historic
association with "international tensions, military destruction, the impoverishment
of peoples, [and] the persecution of minorities.... 440 Despite a vast literature

433. Id. at 59.
434. Id at 63.
435. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26. See generally JUDY
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Principal 24,
OGLETHORPE, ET AL., Overview C: Conservation in Times of War, in CONSERVING THE PEACE:
RESOURCES, LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY 361, 361-83 (Richard Matthew et al. eds., 2002).
436. G.A .Res. 51/240, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/240(Oct. 15, 1997).
437. Ikenberry, supra note 155, at 82.
438. Id.
439. Id
440. Quincy Wright, Economic and Political Conditions of World Stability, 13 J. ECON. HIST. 363,
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supporting Wright's wisdom, confusion still reigns in thinking about the
consequences of dictatorship and the causes of war. It is impossible, therefore, to
talk about human security and sustainable development, without making a short
detour to look at autocratic government. The World Economic Forum reported in
2004 that, "For most of the past 200 years interstate wars have been the major
killers, with the first and second world wars responsible for most combat-related
deaths." 41 Over the last hundred years, wars have flared in virtually every comer
of the Earth, introducing untold misery and destruction. War easily seems the most
tragic experience in the milieu of the human condition.
In fact, while the consequences of war are indeed dreadful, far more
deaths result from autocratic governments murdering their own people. The 170
million genocidal and mass murders committed in cold blood by totalitarian and
authoritarian rulers against their own people account for more than four times the
battle deaths in all the international and civil wars of the twentieth century. 442 The
Soviet Union, China under both communist and Kuomintang rule, Nazi Germany,
Imperial Japan, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and communist Poland and Vietnam lead
44 3
the pack as the most horrendous mass murdering regimes of the last 100 years.
Autocratic government, not war, is the world's major violent killer.
In recent years, leaders and policy-makers have introduced the concept of
"human security" into the global security lexicon. National security focuses on the
security of the state, and interstate warfare is the subject of analysis. Human
security adds a dimension of "thick description" to the security concept by
focusing on the social security and welfare needs of individual people, regardless
of whether they are involved in an interstate war.44 Since far more people were
murdered by their own government than were killed in all the wars over the last
hundred years, the notion of human security introduces a particularly apt concept
into contemporary thought on security.
The concept of human security complements state-centered security
considerations with people-centered security considerations, recognizing the fact
that states often neglect the physical and social needs of their populations. In 1993,
the UNDP declared that security should be reinterpreted as security for people, not

366 (1953), available at http://www.jstor.org/journals/00220507.html.
441. WORLD ECON FORUM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 3.
442. This popular misconception was exposed by nearly fifty years of empirical research
conducted by R.J. RUMMEL, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii. His book,
POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE 92 (1997), is the culmination of a life's
work. See also R. J. Rummel, War Isn't This Century's Biggest Killer, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1986, at 1;
R. J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: ABSOLUTE POWER KILLS ABSOLUTELY 2-4 (2001) (copy on file with
author). For detail on the genocide conducted by communist regimes in the Soviet Union, and the
forty-five million murders that have marked the last hundred years in Chinese history, see R. J.
RUMMEL, LETHAL POLITICS: SOVIET GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1917 (1990); R. J.
RUMMEL, CHINA'S BLOODY CENTURY: GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900, at 15 (1991).

Much of Professor Rummel's groundbreaking work on governmental genocide may be found on his
Internet website, Freedom, Democide, War, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/welcome.html (last
visited Sept. 11,2004).
443. POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE, supranote 409, at 92, 94.
444. See Human Security Network, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php (last
visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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security for nations. 445 Human security should be embraced as complementary to
national security, and it should recognize autocratic government as the greatest
threat to personal security on the planet.
Canada" 6 and Norway 4 7 have been the leading proponents of the
concept, successfully forming the Human Security Network (HSN) in 1999. The
44 8
HSN coalition is comprised of thirteen nations and one observer nation. There is
no doubt that the term "human security" is amorphous. At the first Ministerial
meeting of the HSN in Lysoen, Norway, in May, 1999, the network committed
rights and humanitarian law [as] the foundation for
itself to principles of "human
449
security."
human
building
The principles recognized, "[h]uman security is advanced.., by protecting
and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and
democratic structures, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. ' 450 The principles also recognized that sustainable human development is
essential for building human security.
Canada defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to
''451
It is fair to scrutinize these definitions and much
people's rights, safety or lives.
452
Still, the term is an advance
of the policy research on human security is obscure.
because it highlights the incomplete scope of "national security." Its strength lies
in its inclusiveness, forming a distinct branch of security studies that explores the
particular conditions that affect the survival and prosperity of individuals, groups
453
It also helps to dispel the false comfort and
and societies, rather than states.
assuming that autocratic regimes reflect the
in
have
sometimes
complacency we
preferences of their populations, and that their military and police forces are used
to safeguard civilian populations.

445. PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION, supra note 311, at 2, 3.
446. See CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FREEDOM
FEAR: CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR HUMAN SECURITY 15 (2002), available at

FROM

http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/pdf/freedomfrom fear-en.pdf. Canada's human security program is
described at Foreign Affairs Canada, http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2004).

447. See Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa. Norway: the Official Site In Canada: Human
Security Network, http://www.emb-norway.ca/policy/humansecurity/humansecurity.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2004).
448. The Human Security Network is comprised of the following states: Austria, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand
and South Africa as an observer. "The Network emerged from [Canadian-Norwegian cooperation on]
the landmines campaign and was formally launched at a Ministerial meeting in Norway in 1999.
Conferences at Foreign Ministers level were held in Bergen, in Norway (1999), in Lucerne,
Switzerland (2000), Petra, Jordan (2001), Santiago de Chile (2002), Graz, Austria (2003) and Bamako,
Mali (2004) and Ottawa, Canada (2005)." Human Security Network, supra note 411.

449. Human Security Network: Principles, http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/principles-e.php
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
450. Id.
451.

CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 413,

at 2, 3.
or Hot Air?, 26 INT'L SECURITY 87, 90-91
452. Roland Paris, Human Security: ParadigmShift
(2001), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec 26 02 87_0.pdf.
453. Id. at 102.
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2. Democracy and Regional Security
Much like threats to human security, threats to regional state security and
interstate wars undermine the pursuit of sustainable development. In attempting to
unravel the key source of war, modem scholars have proposed a variety of causes,
including character and personality, 45 4 imbalances in power relationships among
states, 455 deterministic world system models, 456 nationalism, 457 natural aggressive
tendencies inherent in human nature, 45 8 economic theories of imperialism, 459 and
environmental stress. 4 ° We now know that war is caused by non-democratic
regimes that impose
negative externalities of regime behavior onto the regional
46 1

security system.
Democracies manage their foreign affairs with more predictability and are
less prone to create crisis than authoritarian states. Democracies trade with other
nations; autocracies tend not to do So. 462 In democracies, the legislative authority to
ratify trade bargains struck by the executive leads to the search for lower mutually
acceptable trade barriers, producing freer trade outcomes than otherwise would
463
occur.
International trade tends to generate positive economic externalities
outside of the trading relationship, increasing the stability of the entire region. Free
trade and international investment help democracies to socialize non-democratic
nations into an interdependent and liberal world system.46

454. See, e.g., JOHN G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR (2nd ed. 2000).
455. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 6th ed. 1985).
456. See, e.g., GEORGE MODELSKI, LONG CYCLES IN WORLD POLITICS (1987); GEORGE
MODELSKI WORLD SYSTEM HISTORY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF LONG-TERM CHANGE (Robert Allen
Denmark et al. eds., 2000).
457. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, supra note 14, at 174-79.
458. See, e.g., KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 1966); Peter A.
Coming, The Biological Basis of Behavior and Some Implicationsfor PoliticalScience, WORLD POL.
321, 342-44 (1971).
459. See generally, V. I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1939); J. A.
HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY (1965).
460. See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence
from the Cases, INT'L SEC., Summer 1994, at 5, 35-36; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold:
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, INT'L SEC., Fall 1991, at 76, 106-13. For
electronic versions of both International Security articles, along with other research by Homer-Dixon,
see http://www.homerdixon.com/academic.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2004).
461. See John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy,
Interdependenceand InternationalOrganizations,1885-1992, WORLD POL., Oct. 1999, at 1, 34-37.
462. See Edward D. Mansfield et al., Free to Trade: Democracies,Autocracies andInternational
Trade, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 318 (2000).
463. See generally id. (Analyzing international trading relationships from 1960-1990.
Interestingly, the authors found that regardless of the legislature's trading preferences and irrespective
of whether the legislature and executive were from the same or different political parties, freer trade
was still the result. They attribute this to an institutional-structural phenomenon and predict that trade
barriers are lowest between a dyad composed of two democracies. Dyads composed of one democracy
and one autocracy engage in 15-20% less commerce than those composed of two democracies.)
464. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President in Address on China and the
National
Interest,
Voice
of
America
(Oct.
24,
1997),
available
at
http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/jiang97/1024a.htm. "China's economic growth has made it more
dependent on the outside world for investments, markets and energy." Id.
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The findings are robust and extend beyond international trade.
international system,
4 65
Democratic regimes tend to behave more cooperatively in the and
more conflict.
cooperation
international
less
produce
and non-democracies
Moreover, non-democratic states are more likely to behave like democratic states,
a
adopting more democratic norms, as the percentage of democratic states in
466
more
are
states
Democratic and democratizing
regional system increases.
non-democratic states to cooperate
proactive internationally and more likely4 6than
7
with neighbors to build regional security. Moreover, there is a strong connection
between regime type and peaceful foreign policy behavior generally. Democratic
states create a positive ripple effect throughout the international system,
the spread of
implementing norms of peaceful national behavior and influencing
468
the positive,
sum,
In
states.
non-democratic
to
even
states,
other
these norms to
peaceful externalities that democracies generate for the international system
and increased international
include confidence-building, war prevention
469
relations.
foreign
and
cooperation in trade
III. REALIZING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Free political and economic institutions work in a concerted and
and
reinforcing manner to achieve sustainable development. Liberal democracies
environment,
sustainable
more
free market economies produce greater wealth, a
and greater human and national security. A development approach centered on
freedom and democracy holds promise of enriching countless lives throughout the
globe. Free societies, even when those societies are very poor, have proved to be
remarkably dynamic engines of economic growth. It is disconcerting that
development aspirations in many nations remain unfulfilled, captive to the
development orthodoxy.
Over the last fifty years, there persisted an egregious gap between
development aspiration and actual achievement. Speaking in Davos, Switzerland in
2001 at the World Economic Forum, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan offered a
compelling narrative for thinking about world poverty: "Try to imagine what
globalisation can possibly mean to the half of humanity that has never made or
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creating norms such as
States, have tended to served as norm entrepreneurs, generating a pull effect on
third party international dispute settlement, such as mediation.).
469. Leeds &Davis, supranote 432, at 17.
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received a phone call. 47 ° More critically, basic needs are not being met for
hundreds of millions of people. "Half the world's people [still] live on less than $2
a day.''471 "For billions, especially in Africa and the Islamic world, poverty is
spreading and per capita income is falling., 472 Many of the poorest areas cannot
hope to improve without a change of direction. Over the next decade, world
population will increase to 7.1 billion people, creating problems of food
distribution and availability in areas governed by authoritarian regimes.473 By then
nearly half of the world's population could live in areas stressed by water
shortage. 474 The explosive population growth and symphony of development in the
global South is expected to drive a nearly 50 percent increase in the demand for
energy according to some estimates.475
Few doubt that new thinking is needed on sustainable development.
Frustration and a sense of failure permeate the environmental movement, in
particular. James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, laments: "[t]wo decades of talk and treaties have not
stemmed environmental degradation., 476 These wounds are largely self-inflicted.
From the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, to the World Summit in
Johannesburg, the world's body politic has fed on a steady diet of monumental
documents. For the most part, they remain trophies, relics unable to overcome the
ennui that permeates the global environment. Sustainable development has fallen
victim to one of the foremost errors of global policy-making, which is to equate
general goals with specific policies without assessing the effectiveness of those
policies in actually achieving the goals. 477
The panache of globalism and the penchant for global solutions ignores
the dominating influence of the state and second image solutions to issues of
development, security and the environment. From the ancient world to the present,
societies have struggled to be set free from the rule of insular elites. 478 We are on
the cusp of resolving this debate, and to do so in favor of freedom and liberal
democracy could set in motion sustainable development for the world's poorest
470.

Orla Ryan, UN Chief Warns Business, BBC NEWS,

Jan. 28, 2000, available at

http://news.bbe.co.uk/l/hi/business/I 141623.stm (last visited Sep. 11,
2004).
471. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Global Development, InterAmerican
Development
Bank
(Mar.
14,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/O3/print/20020314-7.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
472. Id.
473. GLOBAL TRENDS 2015, supra note 191, at 26-27.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 28.
476. James Gustave Speth, Recycling Environmentalism,FOREIGN POL'Y, Jul.-Aug. 2002, at 74.
477. John Norton Moore, The Legal Tradition and the Management of National Security, in

TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYREs
S. McDOUGAL 321, at

343 (W. Michael Reisman & Bums H. Weston eds., 1976).
478. Two thousand years ago, Plato wrote in The Republic, "There is no end to suffering ... for
our cities, and none, I suspect, for the human race, unless either philosophers become kings in
our
cities, or the people who are now called kings and rulers become, in the truest and most complete sense
of the word, philosophers-unless there is this amalgamation of political power and philosophy, with
all those people whose inclination is to pursue one or other exclusively being forcibly prevented from
doing so." PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 5, 473d at 175 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith, trans.,
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 2000).
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nations. For many of these states, realizing development will only come if they
embrace the new democratic development norm.
A. The DemocraticDevelopment Norm

In the last few years, the attractive power of liberal democracy and
peaceful democracy promotion has experienced promising growth. The year 2000
ushered in the inaugural meeting of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw,
Poland. Over 100 nations met, agreeing upon a text that encompassed core
democratic norms. The gathering expressed a commitment to strengthen
479
Arising directly from the
democracy at the national and international levels.
adopted without dissent
Assembly
General
influence of Warsaw, the UN

Resolution 55/96, Promoting and Consolidating Democracy.

480

By the end of the Cold War, pursuing democracy-not just among friends
but opponents as well-had become a bipartisan goal in American
allies,
and
foreign policy.

48 1

The United States and other countries have been remarkably

effective over the last twenty years in shaping the terms of debate within the UN,
freedom
bringing the rest of the world closer to realizing the noble principles of
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leveraging
and
on
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than
Rather
contained in the UN Charter.
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toward
steps
productive
and
bold
eschewed
efforts, the UN sometimes
to
Now there is tremendous untapped opportunity for the UN Secretary-General
of
democratization
expend the substantial authority resident in his office for the
to
development. More than any other world figure, the Secretary-General is able
effective
of
instrument
an
as
leverage the norms embodied in the UN Charter
483

persuasion.
Clinging to the development orthodoxy threatens progress in sustainable
States
development, and it unnecessarily alienates decision-makers in the United
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479. Community of Democracies, First Ministerial Conference, Final Warsaw
english.pdf.
27, 2000) available at http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/warsaw
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and the Universal
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and elsewhere who are doubtful of its effectiveness. A decade has passed since
Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) criticized UN-sponsored conferences as
"mischief-making" by non-governmental activists who "dictate what the
purported
solutions are to the world's problems.,4 84 In the meantime, the opportunity cost of
the orthodoxy to the poorest nations climbs higher. The quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs imposed on the world's peoples and environment by autocratic
alternatives to democracy are enormous, representing mankind's unrealized human
security. 4s5 For example, Dr. Gyimah-Boadi, a Ghanaian political scientist,
describes how the advent of constitutional and democratic rule in Ghana in 1993
has served to bring progress to Ghana.486 After democracy, the country began to
dismantle the Trokosi system, which is rooted in traditional culture and has been
practiced over centuries:
Under the Trokosi system... prepubescent girls are sent into servitude to
atone for sins committed by members of their families. These girls, who
are consigned to this form of ritual slavery.., serve hand and foot and
minister to the needs of a shrine and its priest. They engage in farm
work and invariably have sexual intercourse with the priest. Moreover,
they are solely responsible for their upkeep and for that of the children
begotten out of the sexual relationships between themselves and the
priests.487
This vignette illustrates that the promotion of liberal democratic norms
faces the challenge of overcoming some of the most recalcitrant cultural practices.
In order to be accepted, the new norms must be peacefully projected and woven
into development programs. Principled education is part of the answer to
dismantling each facet of the development orthodoxy. Professor Steve Finkel at the
University of Virginia has shown that civic education can dramatically expand
citizens' participation in the democratic process in developing countries across a
variety of cultural traditions. 488 Just as tribal cultures are evolving, so too should
the academics approaches that support the orthodoxy through neo-Marxist
dependency theory, anti-Americanism, world systems analysis and relativistic
models of development.
Several countries and international organizations have begun to
emphasize democracy in their development assistance. The United States, for
example, has been especially active in gradually increasing the role of democracy
promotion in international development. Building on President Carter's more
limited concern with human rights, President Reagan launched "Project
Democracy," "The Democracy Program," and the "National Endowment for

484. Republican Congress to Scrutinize Funds Spent on International Conferences, GLOBAL
WARMING NETWORK ONLINE TODAY, Mar. 17, 1995 (1995 WL 2265596).

485. E. Gyimah Boadi, The Cost of Doing Nothing, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 119, (1999).
486. Id. at 120.
487. Id. at 123.
488. Steven E. Finkel, Can Democracy Be Taught? 14 J. DEMOCRACY 137, 140-42 (2003). Finkel
tested education and participation in the Dominican Republic, Poland and South Africa. See also Steve
E. Finkel, Christopher A. Sabatini & Gwendolyn G. Bevis, Civic Education, Civil Society and Political
Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic, 28 WORLD DEV. 1851-74
(2000) (exploring the effect of donor-supported civic education programs on levels of citizen trust in
institutions in the Dominican Republic).
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Democracy ' '489 to promote democratic institutions in other countries. By the end of
Reagan's second term there was a "worldwide democratic revolution"
underway. 490 The Reagan-era organizations have been followed by the creation of
counterpart institutions in other states, particularly the Westminster Foundation in
the United Kingdom and the International Centre for Human Rights and
creating a World
Development in Canada. Together, these institutions are 491
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effective efforts to combat corruption.497 Promotion of market economic solutions
includes encouraging citizens to participate in global trade and capital markets, the
promotion of private sector growth coupled with sustainable management of
natural resources, respect for employee rights, including collective bargaining and
unions, and investment in people through education and quality healthcare.498
The MCA is a radical and pragmatic departure from the global sustainable
development orthodoxy. In emphasizing the dispositive role of good governance in
achieving progress on sustainable development, the MCA incorporates the best of
empirical second image analysis. The program is among the most progressive
development ideas of our time, representing an effective post-orthodoxy model for
erasing poverty and protecting the environment. 499 Millennium Challenge is a
model for sustainable development; it should be replicated by international
organizations and particularly by the United Nations. The most effective UN
measure would be to move democracy and the rule of law from the periphery to
the center of UNDP activities and programs.
It is difficult to underestimate the importance of the interrelationship
between liberal democracy and development. 500 Liberal democracy is correlated
with economic development, environmental protection, human rights and human
501
security and international peace and security.
B. From Prescriptionto Process

Policy-oriented studies, which the Lasswell-McDougal team pioneered at
Yale, have been instrumental in helping international lawyers to understand that
law is not a prescription, but a process. 50 2 Perhaps in no place is this clearer today
than in the realm of sustainable development, where international law attorneys
have an opportunity to engage in transforming the orthodoxy. A global vision of
sustainable development must be able to come to terms with the reality of the
power of democracy and markets, or it risks being marginalized and disregarded,
particularly in the United States. 50 3 Such an occurrence would be a misfortune,
seriously damaging the prospects for real global progress and diminishing the
benefit of immense American resource, ingenuity and influence in solving

497. 22 U.S.C. § 7706(b)(1) (2005).
498. 22 U.S.C. § 7706(b)(2)-(3) (2005).
499. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Dept. of the Treasury, John W. Snow, Prepared
Remarks before the New York Economic Club (Sep.
14, 2004), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1918.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
500. Pritchett & Kaufmann, supra note 346, at 29.
501. By making development assistance (as opposed to humanitarian aid) contingent upon
progress toward democracy, we begin to realize genuine sustainable development. Applicants for aid
should have to make a showing that their programs are developed and executed through democratic
institutions. Recipient nations should have to submit facts and justification reports to articulate how
development projects promote democracy, and those reports should be audited by detailed statements to
ensure that the proposals promote democracy. Siegle et al., supranote 171, at 272-73.
502. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC WORLD
ORDER: THE LEGAL
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(1994).
503. Bolton, supra note 267, at 206-7.
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sustainable development problems. Forty years ago, esteemed international lawyer
Louis Henkin penned advice for self-examination for the liberal internationalist
who strongly supports the vital work of the UN. In describing his subject, Henkin
wrote:
Being far-seeing, he tends to be romantic and sometimes spills over into
sentimentalism. Seeing the other fellow's point of view, and having to
defend it to the chauvinist, he sometimes identifies with it. Concerned
with assuring that others do not reduce moral questions to differences of
taste or judgment, he sometimes elevates his own opinion or preference
to principle. Pressing for decency, fairness and rationality in
international affairs, he is reluctant to recognize the lack of these in
others. Concerned with recognizing the interests and the views of others,
due....504
he may give them more than their
Compounding naivet6, internationalists are prone to make the mistake in thinking
that the nation-state serves the interest of the United Nations; rather it is the United
50 5
The lack in clarity on this
Nations that serves the interests of its member states.
United Nations and has
the
of
point has caused some to doubt the efficacy
56
the UN and its proper
about
thinking
In
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body.
encouraged criticism of the world
to understand both
internationalists
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legal organization
international
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Although
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world
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50 7
faces
also a political organization.
governed by the UN Charter-a treaty-it is
The General Assembly and the Security Council are political as well as
50 8
For international lawyers, the struggle for democracy and
legal bodies.
development is more a political struggle than a legal effort. Henkin warns that we
cannot turn over issues to the UN and expect that something good will happen.
Taking an issue to the UN is not a policy-it is part of the political process. What
will emerge from the UN depends not only on what goes into it, but also on how it
50 9
This sober advice should gives us
is influenced and managed once it gets there.
pause when we work with the United Nations to achieve510sustainable development.
be accurate."
As Henkin said, "to be persuasive, we must
development unfolds, it is easy
democratic
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process
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only
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to
transitioning
511
considered
be
that can
successful and well-functioning. 51 2
twenty-are clearly en route to becoming
region and in Latin America.
These few states generally are found in the Baltic
The vast majority of third wave countries do not seem to be expanding or
deepening their democracy.
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51I.Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, at 9, supra, note 178.
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Many transitional countries are precariously positioned at what Thomas
Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterizes as the
"gray zone. 513 Countries in the gray zone are often no longer emerging
democracies, but rather have congealed into a state of partial-, qualified-, or
pseudo-democracy, stubbornly stuck in the consolidation phase of the democratic
sequence.5t4 This is the most common form of government on Earth today. The
outcome for these states is unclear. In many, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
and Togo, autocracy is re-solidifying. 515 In fact, the process is so difficult for many
of these states that it has caused some to speculate we have reached the end of the
third wave of democracy. 516 Their pace of their journey toward sustainable
development is slowed by the ambivalence over democracy in international
development institutions.517
Through both Republican and Democratic administrations, the United
States has placed democracy at the cornerstone of American security. 1 8 Many
democratic nations and international organizations, however, still fail to regard
democracy promotion as in their vital national interest.5 19 In looking at the decade
from 1992 to 2002, the Democracy Coalition Project completed the first systemic
attempt to document democratic governments' willingness to defend and promote
democracy abroad. The findings of that study suggest that too often parochial
5 20
security and local economic interests trump global democracy promotion.
Ironically enough, it is the newest democracies that are especially eager to enter
into mutually binding commitments to defend democracy. They correctly view
those efforts as enhancing systemic stability and deterrence. 521 It is clear that
democracies become bolder and more assured in promoting democracy when they
5 22
act in conjunction with other democracies through multilateral institutions.
If findings from key disciplines, including political science, comparative
politics, ecology, international relations and economics, are so compelling, then
why is it so difficult to effectively focus effort on achieving sustainable
development? The compelling link between democracy and development opens up
what one World Bank economist describes as a "sensitive and difficult area of
discourse" between donors and the developing states.52 3 Too many decisionmakers have bought into deductive theories that lack application in the real world.
It is hard to look an international official or an NGO colleague in the eye and tell
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them that under-development stems from adherence to faulty deductive models
rooted in world systems and state authoritarianism. It is analogous to the difficulty,
and indeed embarrassment, one might incur by having to sit down with a friend
and tell him he has a drinking problem.
C. Using the Right Tool-Of Case-knives and Pickaxes
Roscoe Pound relates the story about how Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn
524
Tom and Huck discovered that Jim was locked in
freed Jim, the runaway slave.
to rescue him. 525 Although the door of the cabin
determined
were
a cabin, and they
526
The boys could dig a hole
was securely locked, the structure had a dirt floor.
527
It seemed to Huck Finn that some old pickaxes
large enough for Jim to escape.
the boys had found were the proper implements to use for digging the hole that
would set Jim free. 5 28 Tom Sawyer knew better. From reading, Tom knew that case
knives were the right course in such situations:
'It don't make no difference,' said Tom, 'how foolish it is, it's the right
way-and it's the regular way....y.' 'I've read all the books that gives
any information about these things. They always dig out with a caseknife.' So in deference to the books and the properties, the boys set to
work with case-knives. But after they had dug till nearly midnight and
they were tired and their hands were blistered, and they had made little
progress, a light came to Tom's legal mind. He dropped his knife and
turning to Huck, said firmly, 'Gimme a case-knife.' Let Huck tell the
rest:
'He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it
down and says, gimme a case-knife.'
'I didn't know just what to do-but then I thought. I scratched
around amongst the old tools and got a pickaxe and give it to him, and
he took it and went to work and never said a word.' 'He was always
52
just that particular. Full ofprinciple.
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